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Allison K. Hoffman* 
 
 
Abstract: 
U.S. law and policy on long-term care fail to address the insecurity 
American families face due to prolonged illness and disability—a problem that 
grows more serious as the population ages and rates of disability rise. This 
Article argues that, even worse, we have focused on only part of the problem. It 
illuminates two ways that prolonged disability or illness can create insecurity. 
The first arises from the risk of becoming disabled or sick and needing long-term 
care, which could be called “care-recipient” risk. The second arises out of the 
risk of becoming responsible for someone else’s care, which I call “next-friend” 
risk. The law and social welfare policy has focused on the first, but this Article 
argues that the second equally threatens the wellbeing of American families. 
While attempting to mitigate care-recipient risk, in fact, the law has steadily 
expanded next-friend risk, by reinforcing a structure of long-term care that relies 
heavily on informal caregiving. Millions of informal caregivers face financial 
and nonmonetary harms that deeply threaten their own long-term security. These 
harms are disproportionately experienced by people who are already 
vulnerable—women, minorities, and the poor. Scholars and policymakers have 
catalogued and critiqued these costs but treat them as an unfortunate byproduct of 
an inevitable system of informal care. 
This Article argues that if we, instead, understand becoming responsible for 
the care of another as a social risk—just as we see the chance that a person will 
need long-term care as a risk—it could fundamentally shift the way we approach 
long-term care policy. In risk-theory terms, this Article proposes we reimagine 
the risk of long-term care. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Americans’ need for long-term care poses a daunting public policy 
challenge.1 The actual demand for care has grown as the rates of disability 
increase, as modern medicine saves people who previously would not have 
survived, and as the number of “old old” Americans grows.2 An underlying 
panic about the impending long-term care crisis bubbles up regularly in the 
news.3 Private efforts to address it have fallen short. Even the social insurance 
program for long-term care that Ted Kennedy ushered through as part of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA),4 called the CLASS Act,5 
collapsed.6 Congress then tasked a Long-Term Care Commission to generate a 
new solution, and the Commission failed to reach consensus.7 Long-term care 
policy is in limbo.  
Policymakers and scholars who have wrestled with social policy for 
long-term care primarily consider the problem from the perspective of the ten 
million Americans who need such care—in other words from the perspective 
of care-recipient risk. Yet the need for long-term care undermines the security 
of American families in reverberating ways. 
                                               
1 Long-term care—sometimes called “long-term services and supports”— refers to assistance 
for someone with chronic illness or disability who faces physical or cognitive limitations. The 
law defines this care in terms of Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) and Instrumental Activities 
of Daily Living (IADLs). ADLs include personal care, such as bathing, dressing, getting in and 
out of bed, mobility, eating, and toileting. IADLs include more complex functions, including 
managing finances, managing medication, and shopping. INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF 
DISABILITY IN AMERICA 50 (2007) [hereinafter IOM, FUTURE OF DISABILITY].  This Article’s 
discussion of long-term care refers to assistance with ADLs and IADLs, not to home health care 
or medical care (although, as discussed herein, the lines blur at times).  
2 See Section II.B for discussion of other factors that have increased the need for long-term 
care. “Old old” generally refers to people over 80 years old. 
3 See, e.g., Jason Kane, 6 Tips for Averting America’s Looming Long-Term Care Crisis, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Nov. 6, 2013); Bob Kerrey, Long-Term Solutions… ,..for Long-Term Care, CHI. 
TRIBUNE (Nov. 21, 2008), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-11-
21/news/0811200685_1_quality-long-term-care-providers-health-care; Penelope Wang, The 
Retirement Crisis Nobody Talks About: Long Term Care, TIME (June 20, 2014), 
http://time.com/money/2901647/the-retirement-crisis-nobody-talks-about-long-term-care; John 
F. Wasik, Long-Term Care Insurance Can Baffle, With Complex Policies and Costs, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/19/your-money/long-term-care-
insurance-can-baffle-with-complex-policies-and-costs.html. 
4 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 
Stat. 1029. 
5 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 8002(a) 124 Stat. 
119, 828-41 (creating Title XXXII of the Public Health and Safety Act).  
6 The Obama Administration put the program on hold and Congress repealed it because they 
said it was actuarially unsound. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 
642, 126 Stat. 2313, 2358 (2013).   
7  Examining the Finance and Delivery of Long-Term Care in the US: Hearing Before 
Subcomm. On Health of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. (2016) (testimony 
of Alice M. Rivlin, Co-Chair, Long-Term Care Initiative, Bi-Partisan Policy Center).  
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This Article argues that the full insecurity of long-term care becomes 
clear only when we look at the problem also from the perspective of the 
family and friends who are responsible for providing this care. These informal 
caregivers are experiencing what this Article proposes we think of as “next-
friend” risk.8  
The early to mid-twentieth century marked a period of decreased reliance 
on family for long-term care, as social insurance infrastructure developed. 
Local, state, and federal governments funded care in public institutions and 
private nursing homes. Yet, late twentieth century law and policy, especially 
with the creation and evolution of Medicaid, turned the tide back toward older 
traditions of family caregiving and has resulted in a legal structure that 
institutionalizes and intensifies caregiving burdens for American families.  
Medicaid has become the locus of social insurance for long-term care, 
financing sixty percent of all paid long-term care. 9  Because Medicaid 
eligibility is means-tested, Americans must have almost no income or assets to 
qualify. 10  That, plus the fact that few people have any private insurance 
coverage for long-term care, means that most Americans have only two 
choices: “spend down” their savings to become poor enough to qualify for 
Medicaid or, more often, rely on family and friends.   
Yet, even the people eligible for Medicaid increasingly rely on friends 
and family for significant amounts of care. Over the past few decades, 
Medicaid funding for long-term care has shifted from having a bias for care in 
institutions to a bias for care in homes. Now, one-half of Medicaid long-term 
care spending pays for home-based care.11  
The conventional wisdom is that this trend is wholly positive.12 It has 
decreased reliance on poor-quality institutional care, and it enables many 
                                               
8 I borrow the phrase “next friend” from the legal term for a person in litigation who represents 
someone with a disability who is otherwise unable to represent himself. In the context of long-
term care, although not necessarily a legal guardian, the next friend protects the interests of 
another, by providing care directly or arranging it. I use this term instead of “informal 
caregiver” or “family caregiver” to emphasize that the next friend might not provide care 
personally (instead helping to outsource it) and is sometimes, although less frequently, a non-
relative.  
9 Carol V. O’Shaughnessy, National Spending for Long-Term Services and Supports (LTSS), 
2012, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y FORUM 3 (2014), https://www.nhpf.org/library/the-
basics/Basics_LTSS_03-27-14.pdf (excluding Medicare post-acute care). Medicaid, while it 
might have once been arguably an entitlement program, has over time increasingly resembled a 
social insurance program, spreading health spending risk across a growing population of 
beneficiaries, especially when considering long-term care since the program is universal for 
anyone who depletes assets to qualify, as discussed infra note 70.  
10 See infra note 70 (describing Medicaid’s eligibility rules). 
11 Steve Eiken et al., Medicaid Expenditures for Long-Term Services and Supports (LTSS) in FY 
2013: Home and Community-Based Services Were a Majority of LTSS Spending, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 3 (2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-
information/by-topics/long-term-services-and-supports/downloads/ltss-expenditures-fy2013.pdf 
(documenting that home and community-based services accounted for 51.3% of total Medicaid 
spending on long-term services and supports in 2013). 
12 See, e.g., Sidney D. Watson, From Almshouses to Nursing Homes and Community Care: 
Lessons from Medicaid’s History, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 937-38, 967-68 (2010) 
(describing this trend and the benefits of increased home-based care). 
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people with serious illness or disability to live at home as independently as 
possible. On the other hand, Medicaid’s evolving approach amplifies burdens 
for beneficiaries’ family and friends. 
Medicaid programs for home-based care are underfunded and have long 
waiting lists and gaps. These programs often limit personal care services and 
the other non-medical aspects of caregiving that have long been neglected in 
social welfare programs. Family and friends fill these gaps—gaps that were 
not as acute in the era of institutional care. At the end of the twentieth century, 
the law has thus re-inscribed long-term care as a private obligation.  
Yet long-term care as a private obligation is increasingly untenable. The 
actual care needs of people with chronic illness and disability are becoming 
more intensive. 13  At the same time, families and friends are less able to 
address these needs. The breadwinner family structure, where the husband 
earned wages and the wife took care of the home and family, has eroded. 
Single-parent families and two wage-earner households are the new normal, 
leaving little cushion to absorb caregiving. 14  Families have dispersed 
geographically. 15  And the ratio of people needing care to those who can 
provide it is increasing as people live longer and have fewer kids.16   
As a result of increased obligations combined with the changing shape of 
families, informal caregivers, who are disproportionately women, face 
staggering burdens.17 By one estimate, the financial losses alone—including 
forgone income, pensions, benefits, and retirement savings—sustained by the 
average informal caregiver who leaves the workforce to care for a parent are 
$300,000. 18  These monetary losses are just the beginning. Many informal 
caregivers experience permanent harm to their health, relationships, and 
general wellbeing.19  
What if instead of designating these costs as a private obligation, we 
considered them as a collective problem—the manifestation of a social risk? 
                                               
13 See note 185 infra and accompanying text. 
14 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: 2012, 840 tbl. 1337 (2012) 
(documenting the rise in single-parent households); Howard N. Fullerton, Jr., Labor Force 
Participation: 75 Years of Change, 1950-98 and 1998-2025, 1999 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 4 tbl. 
1 (documenting the past and projected increasing participation of women in the U.S. labor 
force).  
15 See Ping Ren, U.S. Census Bureau, Lifetime Mobility in the United States: 2010, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU 1, 3 (2011) (“The U.S. population is characterized by high mobility.”). 
16 See Emily Brandon, 65-and-Older Population Soars, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 9, 2012, 9:15 AM), 
http://money.usnews.com/money/retirement/articles/2012/01/09/65-and-older-population-soars 
(reporting that the proportion of Americans 65 and older has grown from 4.1% in 1900 to 13% 
in 2012). 
17 See infra Section II.C.  
18 METLIFE MATURE MARKET INST., THE METLIFE STUDY OF CAREGIVING COSTS TO WORKING 
CAREGIVERS: DOUBLE JEOPARDY FOR BABY BOOMERS CARING FOR THEIR PARENTS 15 (2011) 
[hereinafter METLIFE, DOUBLE JEOPARDY], 
https://www.metlife.com/assets/cao/mmi/publications/studies/2011/Caregiving-Costs-to-
Working-Caregivers.pdf. Another recent study models the median opportunity costs of two 
years of caregiving for a sick mother to be $164,726. Meghan M. Skira, Dynamic Wage and 
Employment Effects of Elder Parent Care, 56 INT’L ECON. REV. 63, 82 (2015). Since the 
average duration of caregiving is twice as long, see infra note 182 and accompanying text, the 
average caregiver would face opportunity costs twice this amount.  
19 METLIFE, supra note 18, at 15. 
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While caregiving might have been excluded from the American vision of 
social insurance at its nascence, when it was perceived as not posing a threat 
to the security of the breadwinner family, long-term care is clearly a serious 
threat to the security of American families now and should be recognized as 
such.  
This Article offers a new possibility: considering the burdens of 
caregiving, at least with respect to long-term care, as a serious social risk—
one equal to the risk of needing long-term care. This perspective could offer 
insights for two areas of legal scholarship. First, a considerable body of 
health, elder, and disability law and policy scholarship addresses long-term 
care as a social insurance problem, but it assumes the primary insurable risk is 
care-recipient risk.20 Implicit in this work is, in most cases, the inevitability of 
continued, substantial reliance on informal caregiving—a position this Article 
questions. In contrast, a rich body of feminist legal scholarship demands 
greater state support for caregiving, mostly with regard to childcare but to 
some extent also long-term care, based on ideas that caregiving is a public 
responsibility or a public good.21 Seeing the burdens next friends face as a 
social risk provides another justification for enhanced state support, and, even 
more importantly, reframing the costs caregivers face in the language of risk 
justifies social insurance to address these costs.22  
The language of risk is powerful. How a society understands risk 
strongly shapes perceptions of the proper role of the state.23 Every creation or 
expansion of social insurance in the United States required reimagining 
something that had previously been thought of as a private cost or obligation 
instead as a social risk—a threat to American families’ security—in order to 
motivate a collective solution.24  
                                               
20 See infra notes 122-123 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 125-126.  
22 Anne Alstott’s “life-planning insurance” is a form of social insurance for parents of children 
with disabilities. ANNE ALSTOTT, NO EXIT 117-37 (2004). She justifies her proposal based on 
public responsibility owed to these parents in return for their heightened caregiving obligation. 
This Article could support a similar intervention but based on a different rationale—the 
existence of a widely shared social risk. This rationale suggests the need for a social insurance 
solution available to any friend or family member who takes on the responsibility of another’s 
long-term care, not just to parents.  
23 The language of risk is increasingly used to evoke an individual’s responsibility to reduce 
risk though responsible choices, but historically it described problems that warranted a 
collective solution. See, e.g., JACOB HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT (2006) (describing what he 
calls the “personal responsibility crusade” and how it has created insecurity for American 
families by undermining social insurance policies); Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, Embracing 
Risk, in EMBRACING RISK (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002) (describing both an 
increased recognition of social problems in terms of risk and a reactionary trend against 
spreading risk); Martha McCluskey, Rhetoric of Risk and Redistribution of Social Insurance, in 
EMBRACING RISK, supra, at 146 (describing a shift in the United States from concern with the 
risk faced by workers to that faced by employers and big business); Jonathan Simon, Risk and 
Reflexivity: What Socio-Legal Studies Add to the Study of Risk and the Law, 57 ALA. L. REV. 
119 (2005) (describing the evolution of the risks that most concern Americans and changing 
beliefs on how best to manage risk). 
24 Examples of scholarship that describe how an understanding of risk has motivated state 
action to ameliorate it include MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER 
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The costs and obligations next friends shoulder look very similar to other 
insurable risks. Responsibility for the long-term care of another is unplanned 
and often unavoidable. The level of harm is stochastic and unmanageable for 
almost all Americans in the worst-case scenario involving years of intensive 
care. This responsibility threatens Americans’ financial, emotional, and 
physical wellbeing as much as other phenomena that have motivated 
government response, including work injuries, unemployment, outliving one’s 
savings, and medical spending in retirement. 25  Taking next-friend risk 
seriously has at least four major implications for long-term care policies. 
First, it redefines the scale of the problem of long-term care. Current 
policy hides costs borne by next friends, in ways described in Part I below. In 
2013, by one conservative estimate, informal caregivers provided $470 billion 
worth of long-term care services to adults, if time spent caregiving were 
valued at market caregiver wages.26 Accounting for replacement costs for just 
these hours—only a part of the problem—would require additional funding of 
triple Medicaid’s current spending on long-term care. Even if this level of 
additional funding is unlikely, considering these costs as part of the problem 
could at least anchor policymakers on a higher number and a more complete 
view of the costs of long-term care, as discussed in Part II.  
Second, understanding these costs as a manifestation of next-friend risk 
implies that social insurance might be the best tool to address the problem.27 
Part III makes the case for better social insurance protections against next-
                                                                                                                
RELIEF AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (2013); MICHAEL A. GRAETZ & 
JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE (1999); 
THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., SOCIAL INSURANCE: AMERICA’S NEGLECTED HERITAGE AND 
CONTESTED FUTURE (2014); DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE 
ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER (2002); JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED 
WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004); Baker & 
Simon, supra note 23; François Ewald, The Return of Descartes’s Malicious Demon: An 
Outline of a Philosophy of Precaution (Stephen Utz trans.), in EMBRACING RISK, supra note 23, 
at 278-81; and Michele L. Landis, Fate, Responsibility, and ‘Natural’ Disaster Relief: 
Narrating the American Welfare State, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 257, 271 (1999). 
25 These programs are addressed by a mix of mandatory private insurance and social insurance, 
but they share in common that social policy requires risk to be shared collectively, rather than 
borne privately.  
26 Susan C. Reinhard et al., Valuing the Invaluable: 2015 Update, Undeniable Progress, but Big 
Gaps Remain, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. 3 (2015). Note that this estimate, based on eleven 
surveys of family caregivers, only accounts for care recipients age 18 and older and uses an 
hourly wage of $12.51. Other estimates are higher and lower. One study estimates opportunity 
costs of $412 billion for informal elder caregivers under the age of 65 ($522 billion if also 
including those over age 65). Amalavoyal V. Chari et al., The Opportunity Costs of Informal 
Elder-Care in the United States: New Estimates from the American Time Use Survey, 50 
HEALTH SERVS. RES. 871, 877 (2015). The same study estimates replacement costs ranging 
from $221 to 642 billion, depending on whether skilled or unskilled labor is used ($7.25 per 
hour for the former estimate and $21 per hour for the latter). Id.  
27 “Social insurance” is used to refer to government programs that spread risk, such as Medicare 
or Social Security. See MARMOR ET AL., supra note 24. Because social insurance also 
intentionally redistributes resources, some argue that it is actually a tax-and-transfer program 
and not like “real” (meaning private) insurance. See James Kwak, “Social Insurance,” Risk 
Spreading, and Redistribution, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE 
LAW 127 (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., 2015). This view, however, fails to 
recognize that all insurance, private and public, is redistributive from low-risk to high-risk 
people and from the lucky to the unlucky. Pricing can attempt to limit this redistribution or to 
counterbalance regressivity that ensues, but regardless of the extent, redistribution is a defining 
feature of all insurance.  
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friend risk and considers conceptually what it would require to create such 
protections. This Part examines where next-friend risk begins and ends and for 
whom. 
Third, whether with additional funding or not, policies could be designed 
to better mitigate next-friend risk, as discussed in Part IV. There are two ways 
that a next friend could, in theory, respond to another’s need for care: provide 
it personally or pay for care. If she could toggle more freely between these 
two choices—provide or pay—she could determine how to use benefits 
simultaneously to minimize her own harm and to meet the needs of the person 
who needs long-term care. Current policy is focused so narrowly on care-
recipient risk that it does not even see the need for this toggle and often 
prevents it.  
Fourth, recognizing next-friend risk forces the admittedly uncomfortable 
question of whether social policy must better balance the needs of care 
recipients and next friends.  
It is not easy to conceive of a solution to the long-term care problem 
when seen from both the care-recipient and next-friend perspectives, because 
of its sheer magnitude and complexity. But turning a blind eye to the costs 
borne by next friends by hiding these costs in homes across the country is not 
a sustainable solution. Any social insurance policy for long-term care—
whether comprehensive or not—must at least grapple with the reverberating 
ways that long-term care needs undermine Americans’ security; otherwise, 
policies will, in the process of creating security for some, bolster social 
structures that undermine security for others. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF LONG-TERM CARE LAW AND POLICY FROM THE 
CARE-RECIPIENT PERSPECTIVE 
The existence of insurance for long-term care is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. Before the twentieth century, long-term care was the 
responsibility of family or community.28 This notion of familial responsibility, 
however, has been an ambivalent one in the United States since at least the 
mid-nineteenth century, when a “society defined by mobility and free labor” 
weakened presumptions of family obligation.29 As a result, other forms of 
providing and paying for long-term care slowly began to emerge.  
Long-term care insurance—both private and social—has had mixed 
results. Private long-term care insurance has largely failed and, experts agree, 
would be challenging to revive.30 Social insurance has evolved and expanded 
                                               
28 See David Barton Smith & Zhanlian Feng, The Accumulated Challenges of Long-Term Care, 
29 HEALTH AFF. 29, 29 (2010). 
29 HENDRICK HARTOG, SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE YOURS: A HISTORY OF INHERITANCE AND 
OLD AGE 29 (2012). 
30 See Jeffrey R. Brown & Amy Finkelstein, Insuring Long-Term Care in the U.S., 25 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 119, 129-31 (2011). 
REIMAGINING THE RISK OF LONG-TERM CARE 
but is still piecemeal and partial.31 Despite limited reach, both private and 
social long-term care insurance work, in theory, to cushion the harms people 
suffer when they face chronic illness or physical or mental disability. In other 
words, both aim to mitigate care-recipient risk. Policies can pay for variable 
amounts of help with personal care, such as bathing, dressing, getting in and 
out of bed, eating, and using the toilet—collectively referred to as the 
Activities of Daily Living (ADLs)—and also with more complex functions, 
such as managing finances, household chores, medication, and shopping—
collectively, Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs).32 
This Part describes the emergence of long-term care insurance and how, 
in the end, Medicaid became the primary locus of public long-term care 
funding. It illustrates how the development of Medicaid policy from the care-
recipient perspective has provided greater security for some people with 
disabilities and illness, but, at the same time, has increased and cemented 
reliance on friends and family to meet care-recipients’ long-term care needs. 
A.  The Failure of Private Insurance for Long-Term Care  
Private insurance struggles under classic conditions of market failure.33 
Only seven to nine million Americans in 2010 held private long-term care 
insurance policies.34 Experts attribute the low penetration rate of private long-
term care insurance to both perception and prices. Research shows that people 
undervalue the purchase of long-term care insurance due to poor information 
or cognitive biases that cause them to underestimate their future long-term 
care needs.35 This undervaluation is compounded by the high price of policies, 
caused in part by pervasive adverse selection (i.e., people who buy policies 
are more likely to use them).36  
Even without such problems, many people would still forgo private 
coverage. For low- and middle-income people, who might become eligible for 
Medicaid, its existence as a safety net crowds out private coverage.37  For 
                                               
31  See generally EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA: HOME HEALTH 
WORKERS IN THE SHADOW OF THE WELFARE STATE (2012) (describing the evolution of the 
government’s role in paying for caregiving). 
32 IOM, FUTURE OF DISABILITY, supra note 1, at 50. I discuss below in Section II.E. why 
mitigating care-recipient risk does not necessarily mean simultaneously mitigating risk for next 
friends, based on both the comprehensiveness and the particular design of long-term care 
insurance.  
33 See Brown & Finkelstein, supra note 30, at 129.  
34 See Kathleen Ujvari, Long-Term Care Insurance: 2012 Update, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. 1 
(2012), http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/ltc/2012/ltc-
insurance-2012-update-AARP-ppi-ltc.pdf. 
35 See Brown & Finkelstein, supra note 30, at 131; Jeffrey R. Brown, et al., Long-Term Care 
Insurance Demand Limited by Beliefs About Needs, Concerns About Insurers, and Care 
Available from Family, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1294, 1300 (2012). 
36 See Brown & Finkelstein, supra note 30, at 126-28; Mark J. Browne, Adverse Selection in the 
Long-Term Care Insurance Market, in INSURANCE: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS 97 (Pierre-André Chiappori & Christian Gollier eds., 2006); Emily Oster et al., 
Genetic Adverse Selection: Evidence from Long-Term Care Insurance and Huntington Disease, 
94 J. PUB. ECON. 1041 (2010) (showing selection among people with Huntington Disease into 
long-term care insurance markets).  
37 See Jeffrey R. Brown & Amy Finkelstein, The Interaction of Public and Private Insurance: 
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those unlikely to qualify for Medicaid, the decision not to buy long-term care 
insurance might be a way for aging parents to ensure family members will 
care for them personally, in their homes, rather than use policy benefits to put 
them in a nursing home.38 Since private insurance generally does not pay for 
family care, having private insurance is less appealing to people who prefer 
that a family member or close friend provide care.39 
Because of these problems, the current private market is unraveling. 
Premium rates are unstable and for some policies the benefits are not 
guaranteed or inflation protected.40 Even in the best case, benefits are typically 
insufficient to pay for all necessary care, especially for someone who wants to 
receive care at home.41 One expert notes that “the prospective insured must 
have access to a dependable network of family, friends, and others to 
supplement the [paid] home care provider if she expects to use the policy’s 
benefits for home care.”42  
In light of these challenges, many major insurers are terminating their 
business in long-term care.43 Several attempts to revive the market, through 
tax incentives and programs that offer people who purchase private policies 
Medicaid eligibility with greater asset protection, have had little effect. 44 
There may be ways to reverse this trend, 45  but to the extent the private 
insurance market continues to struggle, social insurance offers the only viable 
option for long-term care insurance for most Americans.  
B.  The Evolution and Limits of Social Insurance for Long-Term Care  
Long-term care has not fit easily into the particular American vision of 
social insurance either and, as a result, social insurance policies to address 
long-term care needs have been incremental and incomplete. President 
Theodore Roosevelt described the goal of social insurance as protection 
against the “hazzards [sic] of sickness, accident, invalidism, involuntary 
                                                                                                                
Medicaid and the Long-Term Care Insurance Market, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1083, 1092-93 
(2008). 
38 Mark V. Pauly, The Rational Nonpurchase of Long-Term-Care Insurance, 98 J. POL. ECON. 
153, 163 (1990). 
39 Corina Mommaerts, Long-Term Care Insurance and the Family (Nov. 11, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (draft on file with author) (showing that informal care by family members weakens 
demand for long-term care insurance).  
40 Insurers are prohibited from raising rates for individual policyholders, but they can and have 
raised rates for an entire class of policies, doubling or even tripling premiums and causing 
policyholders to drop coverage. See Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Planning’s Greatest Gap: 
Funding Long-Term Care, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 407, 440 (2007). 
41 Id. at 432. 
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 442. 
44 Id. at 443-48. Because any assets in excess of insurance benefits must be depleted and the 
home equity limits still apply, this program really only targets those just above Medicaid 
thresholds. Id.  
45 See Brown & Finkelstein, supra note 30; Brown & Finkelstein, supra note 37. 
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unemployment and old age.”46 These hazards shared the common feature of 
threatening the family wage due to a breadwinner’s inability to work.47 The 
role of social insurance, in turn, was to replace lost wages. Long term-care 
was not seen as a threat to the family wage. Non-medical caregiving was 
perceived as being absorbed seamlessly into a breadwinner household 
structure by the non-wage-earning wife.48 Even medical care was relatively 
inexpensive and often ineffective at the time when social insurance first 
emerged.49 As a hybrid of medical care and caregiving, long-term care was a 
low priority for early social policy efforts.  
Over time, however, social policies took up long-term care, and Medicaid 
eventually emerged as the locus for long-term care social insurance policy. To 
be clear, a variety of other government programs address other needs of 
people with chronic illness or disability by, for example, replacing a portion 
(albeit small) of lost wages through disability insurance 50  or paying for 
medical needs through medical insurance. These programs, while critically 
important for people with disabilities and chronic illness, do not address or 
account for their long-term care needs—the assistance that they require on a 
daily basis.  
This Section describes Medicaid’s emergence and evolution, how it has 
attempted to address the needs of care recipients, and, in the process, how it 
has reaffirmed and intensified obligations for their friends and family. 
1. The Emergence of Social Policy on Long-Term Care 
In the early 1900s, long-term care was “the last holdover of the 
Elizabethan poor-law approach.”51 The only public welfare for long-term care 
was provided in poorhouses, which “amounted to incarceration for 
destitution.”52 Most people remained reliant on family care.53  
                                               
46 Theodore Roosevelt, Address Before the Convention of the National Progressive Party in 
Chicago, Illinois (Aug. 6, 1912) (transcript at http://www.ssa.gov/history/trspeech.html). 
47 GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 24, at 212. In the breadwinner family structure, the husband 
earned the wages and the wife cared for the household and family. See, e.g., ALICE KESSLER-
HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 
TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (2001). 
48  BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 31; see also Andrew I. Batavia et al., Toward a National 
Personal Assistance Program: The Independent Living Model of Long-Term Care for Persons 
with Disabilities, 16 J. HEALTH, POL’Y & L. 523, 527 (1991) (describing traditional reliance on 
a system of “informal support” provided by family members and close friends); Katherine C. 
Pearson, Filial Support Laws in the Modern Era: Domestic and International Comparison of 
Enforcement Practices for Laws Requiring Adult Children To Support Indigent Parents, 20 
ELDER L.J. 269, 272 (2012)(describing how filial support laws support this notion of family 
caregiving). One early exception was the creation of public institutions for the care of the 
“feebleminded” in the early 1900s. E. FULLER TORREY, AMERICAN PSYCHOSIS: HOW THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DESTROYED THE MENTAL ILLNESS SYSTEM 4 (2013).  
49 See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 383, 388 (1982).  
50 Disability benefits, including Social Security Disability, Supplemental Security Income, and 
Workers Compensation, together replace only 25% of lost income and are insufficient to pay 
for long-term care needs. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 24, at 84.  
51 Smith & Feng, supra note 28, at 27. 
52 Id.; see Watson, supra note 12, at 940.  
53 Even for family members in institutions, women were responsible for taking care of clothing, 
bedding, and other necessities. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 31, at 20. 
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But over the course of the twentieth century, publicly funded support for 
long-term care grew. Early efforts at the state and local levels funded the 
creation of public hospitals, state mental asylums, and schools for the blind 
and the deaf.54 After the Great Depression, the federal government entered 
into the fold with cash and in-kind assistance programs to support people with 
disabilities. Federal efforts began in earnest with the Social Security Act of 
1935, which included the Old-Age Assistance program (for poor elderly), Aid 
to the Blind, and Aid to Dependent Children, which were all programs of cash 
assistance.55  
These programs ushered in a private nursing home industry. The federal 
matching funds for institutional care could not be used for “an inmate of a 
public institution,” including state mental asylums and almshouses. 56  The 
availability of this restricted funding spurred the growth of new private 
institutions that could accept the funds.57  
Even as nursing home care expanded, home-based care continued with 
the support of various local, state, and federal efforts including the Works 
Progress Administration’s “Housekeeping Services.” 58  These programs 
funded everything from nursing care to personal care and even housework and 
childcare, in some cases, for ill or disabled mothers.59 The mid-century rise of 
private medical insurance, however, began to undermine these home-based 
care programs. Insurance required services that were medical in nature to be 
performed by licensed providers, which relocated the medical aspects of 
caregiving from homes to hospitals. The other care-intensive aspects were 
carved out of medical insurance and left to underfunded state welfare 
programs.60  
Modeled on this medicalized framework, the 1960 amendments to the 
Social Security Act, including the Kerr-Mills Act, were the precursor to 
Medicaid and the beginning of more substantial public funding for long-term 
care.61 These amendments expanded eligibility for benefits to the “medically 
needy”—people who were living above state public assistance levels but 
spending a large share of their income on medical care—and defined medical 
assistance to include long-term care. 62  With an expanded population of 
eligible beneficiaries and a continued bias toward funding long-term care in 
                                               
54 See Watson, supra note 12, at 941. 
55 Id. at 941-47; Smith & Feng, supra note 28, at 31. 
56 Watson, supra note 12, at 942; see Smith and Feng, supra note 28, at 31. The federal mental 
health legislation in the 1940s similarly prohibited federal funds to be spent on people living in 
state mental health hospitals. TORREY, supra note 48, at 26. 
57 Watson, supra note 12, at 944.  
58 BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 31, at 22. 
59 Id. at 30.  
60 Id. at 65. 
61 Watson, supra note 12, at 946-48. The Kerr-Mills Act was officially titled the Medical 
Assistance for the Aged. Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, §§ 601-04, 
74 Stat. 924, 987-92. 
62 Watson, supra note 12, at 948-50. 
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private, licensed institutions, the Kerr-Mills Act increased the number of 
private nursing homes tenfold and laid the conceptual and structural 
foundation for Medicaid.63  
2.  Medicaid and the Modern Era of Social Insurance 
The establishment of Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid for the 
“deserving poor” in 1965 meant increasing social-insurance coverage of long-
term care within the medicalized model. 64  Although neither program was 
specifically focused on long-term care, Medicaid became the default social 
insurance program responsible for it. 
Despite the common misconception otherwise, Medicare funds long-term 
care at best “tangentially,” such as post-acute care after hospitalization, but it 
does not pay for support with activities of daily living in home settings.65 In 
fact, Medicare was intentionally not tailored to the needs of chronically ill 
elderly because the drafters envisioned it would eventually expand into a 
universal program for all Americans.66 Long-term nursing care was excluded 
from Medicare altogether because it was deemed more custodial than 
medical.67 One study found that even in cases with Medicare reimbursing 
home health care, family caregivers still provided three-quarters of needed 
care, including in half of cases, performing skilled nursing care, such as 
monitoring blood pressure and symptoms, and providing counseling or 
physical or speech therapy.68 In effect, Medicare is not intended to and does 
not insure long-term care.  
In contrast, Medicaid now finances over sixty percent of all paid long-
term care services. 69  It is a cooperative program between the federal 
                                               
63 See id. at 950-51. 
64 Some would refer to Medicaid as a welfare program because it is means-tested, but because it 
spreads the risk of medical costs among a large portion of the population, it can also be thought 
of as a form of social insurance. See supra note 25. 
65 Judith Feder et al., Long-Term Care in the United States: An Overview, 19 HEALTH AFF. 40, 
44 (2000). Medicare pays for “post-acute” care, including 90 days of hospital care and a portion 
of another 100 days of care in a skilled nursing facility or nursing home following 
hospitalization. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(i) (2012) (requiring hospitalization for at least three days 
and transfer to the skilled-nursing facility within thirty days). Medicare also has a home-health 
benefit that includes nursing care and rehabilitative services, such as speech or physical 
therapy. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m) (covering skilled nursing care or rehabilitative services under a 
plan established by a doctor and reviewed every 60 days). Nursing care is limited to less than 8 
hours per day and 28 hours per week and must be provided by or under the supervision of a 
registered professional nurse. Id. 
66 See MARMOR ET AL., supra note 24, at 232-33.  
67 Watson, supra note 12, at 956. 
68 Carole Levine et al., “This Case is Closed”: Family Caregivers and the Termination of Home 
Health Care Services for Stroke Patients, 84 MILBANK Q. 305, 315-16 (2006). 
69 O’Shaughnessy, supra note 9, at 3 (excluding Medicare post-acute care). Individuals finance 
22% out of pocket and private insurance finances 12%. Id. Other public programs, including the 
Department of Veterans Affairs or Department of Housing and Urban Development funding for 
supportive services and housing for elderly or disabled residents of HUD-assisted housing, only 
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government and the states. Federal regulations dictate eligibility and benefits 
parameters for the state-run Medicaid programs and have shaped the face of 
long-term care provision in the United States.  
Several aspects of Medicaid’s design have been particularly significant. 
First, even though Medicaid is now the primary financier for paid long-term 
care, it is available to only the poorest Americans with significant medical 
need and low income and assets. 70  Covering this population served as a 
release valve. By addressing the needs of the most vulnerable people, 
Medicaid alleviated the urgency for a more comprehensive long-term care 
solution. Most Americans, somewhere in the middle of poor enough to qualify 
for Medicaid and wealthy enough to afford a private long-term care policy, 
turn to family and friends to fill in the gap (so long as they are fortunate 
enough to have someone to whom to turn).71  
Second, in the model of the Kerr-Mills Act, Medicaid adopted a 
medicalized approach.72 It initially had an “institutional bias” favoring the 
provision of long-term care in licensed nursing homes. 73  Care in nursing 
homes and other licensed institutions was designated a mandatory Medicaid 
benefit—one that states must cover to receive federal matching funds.74 In 
contrast, personal care in home settings (e.g., bathing, dressing, eating, light 
housework, grocery shopping, etc.) was designated as an optional benefit—
states could receive matching funds for this type of care but did not need to 
cover it.75 These rules had two implications. First, Medicaid’s benefit structure 
                                                                                                                
financed $10 billion in long-term care in 2012. JULIE STONE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40718, 
LONG-TERM CARE (LTC): FINANCING OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 11-13 (2009). The 
Older Americans Act (OAA) includes in-kind assistance for people living at home; its biggest, 
called “meals on wheels,” provides meals to older people in home settings. Wendy Fox-Grage 
& Kathleen Ujvari, The Older Americans Act, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. 2 (2014) (reporting that 
meals on wheels served approximately 2.5 million people in 2011). The total OAA budget was 
only $1.88 billion in fiscal year 2014. Id. at 3.  
70 In most states an individual’s Medicaid eligibility is tied to eligibility for the Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) program, which provides means-tested cash assistance for disabled, 
blind, or aged individuals. States may extend eligibility to others with higher incomes up to 
300% of the federal poverty level. See JULIE STONE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33593, 
MEDICAID COVERAGE FOR LONG-TERM CARE: ELIGIBILITY, ASSET TRANSFERS, AND ESTATE 
RECOVERY 4-5 (2008). Some qualify, even if above these income thresholds, by showing high 
medical bills that effectively deplete or “spend down” their income to eligibility levels. Id. at 4. 
Beneficiaries must also meet low assets standards, which is in most states under $2000 for an 
individual and under $3000 for a couple, excluding some assets, such as a car and some value 
of a residence. Id. at 6-7. 
71 Long-term care is not included in the typical private health insurance plan. Medigap plans 
might pay for assistance with ADLs but only in some plans and with a low dollar limit. Kaplan, 
supra note 40, at 421. 
72 See Smith & Feng, supra note 28, at 31. 
73 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 61 (2004). 
74 See STONE, supra note 69, at 7. States must also fund home health care for people who would 
otherwise be eligible for nursing facility services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(D) (2012). 
Medicaid also adopted the Kerr-Mills eligibility category of medically needy. Id. § 
1396a(a)(10)(C). Since many medically needy spend down on long-term care, this policy 
increased the numbers beneficiaries in need of nursing home care. See Watson, supra note 12, 
at 955-56. 
75 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(24), 1396d(a)(22).  
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created incentives for more long-term care in nursing homes. Second, as 
Medicaid’s institutional bias receded in favor of home-based care, as 
described below, states’ programs did not cover all of the services people 
might need at home, since many were optional benefits.  
Finally, because of statutory rules that limited the use of federal matching 
funds for care in public institutions, Medicaid furthered the dismantling of 
state public institutions for long-term care and the proliferation of private 
nursing homes to take their place.76 Medicaid made nursing homes a federally 
funded alternative for people with developmental delays and psychological 
illness, as well as an option for care for aging parents.77 Spending on nursing 
homes increased exponentially after the passage of Medicaid, from $46 
million in 1960 to $3.5 billion by 1967.78 Medicaid thus significantly reshaped 
the institutional structure of long-term care.  
Medicaid laid the foundation for a system of long-term care where only 
the poorest Americans were socially insured and where private nursing homes 
became the locus of care. It helped to dismantle public institutions but offered, 
for a period of time, an institutional alternative that continued to provide 
options for long-term care outside of the home. This institutional bias took the 
pressure off family caregivers and reduced their obligation, at least 
temporarily.  
3.  Medicaid’s Recent Shift: Care Returns Home 
Over the past few decades, however, Medicaid’s institutional bias has 
receded, replaced by policies that aim to increase the autonomy of people with 
disabilities by helping them remain at home but, in turn, increase obligations 
for informal caregivers. Medicaid’s evolving policies, have resituated the 
home as the locus of long-term care. This “rebalancing” has resulted in home- 
and community-based care increasing from eighteen percent of Medicaid’s 
long-term care spending in 1995 to just over fifty percent in 2013.79 More than 
three-quarters of people receiving long-term care assistance now live in home 
or community settings, which, in nearly all cases, means in their home or in 
the home of a family member.80  
Medicaid’s shift to home-based long-term care has been largely 
motivated by care recipients’ preferences to remain at home, which is why I 
                                               
76 It prohibited payment for care in Institutions for Mental Diseases, which created incentives 
for states to move people from state-funded mental asylums to private nursing homes that were 
eligible for federally Medicaid matching funds. See TORREY, supra note 48, at 73. 
77 Watson, supra note 12, at 953. 
78 Id. at 952. 
79 Eiken et al., supra note 11, at 7 fig.1. 
80 NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING & AARP, INC., CAREGIVING IN THE U.S.: 2009, at 8 (2009) 
[hereinafter NAT’L ALLIANCE, CAREGIVING], 
http://www.caregiving.org/data/Caregiving_in_the_US_2009_full_report.pdf (“Half of 
caregivers say their loved one lives in his or her own home (51%), while 29% live together with 
their care recipient. Only 4% of caregivers say that their care recipient lives in a nursing home 
and the same percentage say their recipient’s home is an assisted living facility.”); STONE 2008, 
supra note 70, at 3.  
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describe it as policymaking from the care-recipient perspective. Early calls for 
home-based care came from the “independent living movement,” an effort in 
the 1970s initiated by several working-age people with disabilities in 
Berkeley, to remain and live independently in their communities.81 Scandals 
regarding the deplorable conditions in private nursing homes and public 
institutions, coupled with concern over the growing costs of long-term care in 
these institutions, fanned the flames of the movement.82 Efforts were driven 
by the beliefs that outcomes are better and care is less expensive in home 
settings, but both of these beliefs are at best weakly substantiated 
empirically.83  
Deinstitutionalization litigation in the 1980s and 1990s challenged the 
conditions in and reliance on institutional care.84 This litigation was supported 
by two very different groups: on the one hand, civil libertarians who wanted to 
end care in settings perceived to be “oppressive, dehumanizing, and 
antitherapeutic,” and, on the other, fiscal conservatives, who saw care at home 
as a way to cut spending.85 They both aimed to unsettle institutions notorious 
for poor conditions and expensive care.  
This litigation played out successfully in two waves. The first challenged 
the standards of treatment in public institutions on substantive due process 
grounds, relying on the assumption—one that proved true—that court orders 
requiring higher standards would make it too expensive for states to run these 
institutions.86 The second wave relied on the then-recently passed Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and its mandate to administer services 
“in the most integrated setting appropriate.”87 The ADA enabled litigants, for 
the first time, to challenge conditions in publically-funded private institutions, 
                                               
81 Batavia et al., supra note 48, at 528-29.  
82 See Smith & Feng, supra note 28, at 32.  
83 See Avalere Health, Medicaid-Financed Home and Community-Based Services Research: A 
Synthesis, AM. HEALTH CARE ASS’N 5 (2007), 
https://www.ahcancal.org/research_data/funding/documents/hcbs_research_synthesis.pdf 
(reporting that home- and community-based services are not cost-effective for state budgets); 
ANDREA WYSOCKI ET AL., LONG-TERM CARE FOR OLDER ADULTS: A REVIEW OF HOME AND 
COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES VERSUS INSTITUTIONAL CARE 20-21 (2012), 
https://effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/ehc/products/369/1277/CER81_Long-Term-
Care_FinalReport_20121023.pdf (surveying studies comparing nursing homes, assisted living, 
and HCBS programs and finding insufficient evidence on cost savings and most outcomes); 
David C. Grabowski, The Cost-Effectiveness of Noninstitutional Long-Term Care Services: 
Review and Synthesis of the Most Recent Evidence, 63 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 3, 20 (2006); 
Roger J. Stancliffe et al., The Economics of Deinstitutionalization, in COSTS AND OUTCOMES OF 
COMMUNITY SERVICES FOR PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES (Roger J. Stancliffe & K. 
Charlie Lakin eds., 2004) (showing the degree of cost savings as related to the degree of 
deinstitutionalization in a state). 
84  See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 14 (2012).  
85 Id. at 15.  
86  Id. at 26. The Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Youngberg v. Romeo held that 
institutionalized persons have “constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable 
care and safety.” 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982). 
87 28 C.F.R § 35.130(d) (2016).  
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including the private nursing home industry that Medicaid grew.88 In 1999, the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring held that 
institutionalization, when avoidable, can be a form of discrimination against 
people with disabilities. 89  States were required to make “reasonable 
modifications” to their Medicaid programs in response to Olmstead.90 
It is telling that a number of family members of people with disabilities 
initially were part of the coalition but later splintered off because of concerns 
that the legal strategies pursued would unsettle institutions without offering 
alternatives, 91  leaving them with unmanageable caregiving obligations. As 
they anticipated, the litigation created a tug of war for funding between 
institutions and programs for home- and community-based services. When 
enough people moved out of institutions, the fixed costs became too high to 
keep them open for individuals (or their guardians) who preferred institutional 
care, and a majority of public institutions closed. 92  
In parallel to this litigation, Medicaid policies were increasingly making 
it easier for states to deinstitutionalize long-term care. Most importantly, 
Congress passed section 1915(c) of the Social Security Act in 1981, which 
allowed states to seek waiver approval to offer home- and community-based 
services instead of the institutional care that they otherwise were required to 
provide for all qualifying beneficiaries.93 These waiver programs now operate 
in nearly all states and constitute two-thirds of Medicaid spending on home- 
and community-based services.94 
Policies that create incentives for states to shift to home- and community-
based care continued in the subsequent decades. In 1991, the Department of 
Health and Human Services developed programs where states could offer 
Medicaid beneficiaries the ability to “self-direct” long-term care benefits,95 
which means they may pay any capable providers of services, including 
                                               
88  Some deinstitutionalization advocates have even opposed care in multi-unit community-
based settings and have attempted to label them “institutions” for purposes of Olmstead 
challenges. Bagenstos, supra note 84, at 48-49. 
89 527 U.S. 581, 601 (1999) (reasoning that “confinement in an institution severely diminishes 
the everyday life activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work 
options, economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment”). 
90  See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2016). The exception is when modification would 
“fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program or activity.” Id. 
91 Some parents pursued separate litigation to improve the conditions in institutions. DAVID J. 
ROTHMAN & SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 45-50 (1984). 
92 Bagenstos, supra note 84, at 7-9, 30; Stancliffe, et al., supra note 83, at 295. 
93  Medicaid Benefits, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Benefits/Medicaid-
Benefits.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2016); see also STONE, supra note 69, at 9-10 (summarizing 
the 1915(c) home- and community-based services program). Waivers allow states to target 
services by age, diagnosis or geography, rather than having to be available statewide. Id. at 9. 
94 TERENCE NG ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED, MEDICAID HOME AND 
COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICE PROGRAMS: 2012 DATA UPDATE 6-7 (2015), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/report-medicaid-home-and-community-based-services-programs-
2012-data-update (estimating 74 percent of funds on home- and community-based services are 
spent under 1915(c) waivers).  
95 Jeffrey S. Crowley, Medicaid Long-Term Services Reforms in the Deficit Reduction Act, 
KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED 15 (2006) (describing Section 1115 waivers for 
Cash and Counseling). 
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS 16:2 (2016) 
257 
parents of children with disabilities and spouses.96 The Deficit Reduction Act 
of 2005 and ACA created and extended a program called Money Follows the 
Person, which offers enhanced federal Medicaid matching funds to a state for 
twelve months after the state discharges an individual from institutional care 
to home care.97 Nearly all states participate in this program, which, as of mid-
2015, had prompted the transition of 50,000 individuals out of institutions and 
into home settings.98 In effect, these two programs pay states a premium to 
move people out of institutions.  
The result of this litigation and the policy reforms of the late twentieth 
century is that after several decades of momentum in the other direction, the 
law has quietly reaffirmed and solidified the home as the primary locale for 
long-term care. Federal policy began the large-scale dismantling of public 
institutions that states had established, a dismantling completed by civil rights 
litigation. In their place, Medicaid initially favored private institutions, but in 
recent years, this institutional bias has receded, replaced by favor for 
programs for home- and community-based services. The law has thus shifted 
long-term care back into the home and structurally reinforced its place there. 
C.  The Resulting Structure of Long-Term Care  
Increasing reliance on home- and community-based services offers 
considerable benefits from a care-recipient perspective. It has freed many 
people from subpar conditions in facilities. People can stay in their homes and 
live as independently as possible, which can be transformative. 99  But the 
consequence of this reform has been to intensify and cement obligations for 
friends and family.  
The number of people living in institutions has sharply declined. The 
census of people with developmental disabilities in state institutions is only 
sixteen percent of what it was at its peak in 1967, and the population of state 
and local psychiatric hospitals is nine percent of its peak and declining.100 
Age-adjusted institutional use among older Americans decreased by thirty-
seven percent between 1984 and 2004.101 The actual number of older people 
                                               
96 Benefits cannot be used to pay non-relative who owns or operates the facility or home in 
which the beneficiary lives, presumably to prevent moral hazard. Id. 
97 Id. at 9-11;, Medicaid Long-Term Services and Supports: Key Changes in the Health Reform 
Law, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1 (2010), 
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8079.pdf. The Deficit Reduction 
Act also enabled states to expand eligibility for these services for higher earners without having 
to go through the waiver approval process. Id. 
98 Money Follows the Person: A 2015 State Survey of Transitions, Services, and Costs, KAISER 
COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED 1 (2013) (reporting over 50,000 transitioned and another 
10,000 in progress). 
99 See, e.g., Watson, supra note 12, at 937. 
100 Bagenstos, supra note 84, at 29. The census of people with a developmental disability in 
state institutions peaked in 1967 at just under 200,000. Id. at 7. The census of people with 
psychiatric disabilities in state institutions peaked in 1955 at just under 560,000. Id. at 9.   
101 DONALD L. REDFOOT & ARI HOUSER, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., MORE OLDER PEOPLE WITH 
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living in institutions declined from a high of 2 million people in 1989 to 1.4 
million in 2004, even as the absolute number of older Americans grew.102 By 
one estimate, if the rates of institutional use and disability had both remained 
constant, nearly 750,000 additional older people would have been living in 
institutions by 2004.103 Likewise, by one estimate nearly 950,000 would have 
been in mental institutions in 2000; only 50,000 individuals were in 2003.104 
Medicaid spent $24 billion less on nursing homes in 2004 than the program 
would have if institutionalization rates had remained constant from 1984.105  
What is more, there has been a substantial increase in the number of 
people with the very highest levels of disability living at home.106 As one 
example, from 1999 to 2004, there was a twenty-four percent increase in the 
number of people living in home or community settings who need help 
toileting and a nearly twenty percent increase in the number who need 
mobility assistance.107 The greatest increases occurred among the oldest old,108 
among widowed or unmarried people, especially women,109 and among lower-
income beneficiaries.110 This means that the number of poor, sick, old people 
living at home is increasing, due largely to Medicaid policies.  
Importantly, funding for care in home settings has been insufficient. 
States have struggled to fund home- and community-based services.111 The 
Medicaid waiver programs for these services must be budget neutral, or cost a 
state no more than what it would have spent to provide institutional care for 
the same beneficiaries. Yet, studies that compare a similar person in home 
versus institutional care suggest home-based care is not less expensive, as 
anticipated, due in part to scale disadvantages of care in smaller settings and 
also to the costs of developing networks of caregivers, crisis services, and case 
management.112  
When a beneficiary is living in a nursing home, personal care needs are 
part of the total Medicaid-funded package. But when a beneficiary is living at 
home, individual care needs can be and have been carved out. Unmet needs in 
nursing homes are more visible and reprehensible, but unmet needs in home 
                                                                                                                
DISABILITIES LIVING IN THE COMMUNITY: TRENDS FROM THE NATIONAL LONG-TERM CARE 
SURVEY, 1984-2004, at 3 (2010), http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/ltc/2010-08-disability.pdf 
(using age-adjusted data based on the National Long-Term Care Survey).  
102 Id. at 21. 
103 Id. at 25 (based on institutional use in 2004).  
104 Bagenstos, supra note 84, at 9. 
105 REDFOOT & HOUSER, supra note 101, at 24.  
106 Id. at 25 (reporting that the share with disabilities in two or more ADLs increased from 57.5 
to 69.5% from 1984 to 2004).  
107 Id. at 27.  
108 Id. at 28 (citing an 85% increase in people ages 85-94 and 240% increase in people over 95 
years old with disability in two or more ADLs living in the community). 
109 Id. at 28 (citing an 81% increase for widowed people, as compared to a 39% increase for 
married people, and a 79% increase for women, as compared to a 45% increase for men, living 
with disabilities in multiple ADLs in the community).  
110 Id. at 44 (three out of five older persons living in the community with disabilities in two or 
more ADLs report incomes less than $20,000).  
111 NG ET AL., supra note 94, at 12-13. 
112 See studies cited supra note 82. 
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settings are private and invisible to anyone other than close friends and 
family. 
Most people in home- and community-based long-term care waiver 
programs have some unfunded care needs. To meet budget neutrality 
requirements, states have developed these programs with gaps—excluding 
some disabling conditions, limiting enrollment, or prohibiting aides or 
assistants from helping with some personal care activities, such as bathing or 
dressing.113 Moreover, in 2013 more than 536,000 people were on waiting 
lists for these programs with an average wait time of over two years.114 States 
also carve out and underfund personal care services for beneficiaries in the 
regular state programs. The few states that do pay for personal care limit it: 
for example, Utah and West Virginia allow only sixty hours of personal care 
per month, and Utah requires care be supervised by a registered nurse.115 
To make matters worse, as part of a 1997 payment reform, Medicare 
reduced funding for post-acute home health care. 116  In the three years 
following these changes, Medicare spending on home health fell from $17.7 
billion to $8.5 billion, and the number of Medicare home health beneficiaries 
declined by 30 percent.117 Even though this funding was for medical care, 
never for personal assistance, its decrease has meant less nursing assistance 
and rehabilitative care in the home, so informal caregivers are now doing what 
medical professionals once did. 
As a result of all of these policies, the average care recipient is 
experiencing a decline in formal paid care through social insurance programs, 
with the steepest decline in skilled care for those with more severe 
disabilities.118 For the lucky ones, family members or friends are stepping in 
to fill this gap in social insurance benefits. One study commented: “if patient 
care did not suffer as a result of reduced support from formal care sources, 
increased reliance on family caregivers is likely to have played an important 
role in minimizing adverse consequences.”119 In fact, nearly three-quarters of 
older people living in the community now receive family care only.120 The 
work for the average informal caregiver has increased in level, complexity, 
and intensity.121 
                                               
113 NG ET AL., supra note 94, at 12-14. 
114 Id. at 3 
115  Medicaid Benefits: Personal Care Services, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (2012), 
http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/personal-care-services.  
116 ARI HOUSER ET AL., AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., TRENDS IN FAMILY CAREGIVING AND PAID 
HOME CARE FOR OLDER PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN THE COMMUNITY: DATA FROM THE 
NATIONAL LONG-TERM CARE SURVEY 36 (2010), http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/ltc/2010-09-
caregiving.pdf. 
117 Id. (declining from 3.6 million to 2.5 million beneficiaries). 
118 Id. at 32 (reporting a decline between 1999 and 2004 on the average hours of skilled care per 
individual with three or more ADL limitations). 
119 Id. at 36. 
120 Id. at 20.  
121  NAT’L ALLIANCE, CAREGIVING, supra note 80, at 23 (noting that the “proportion of 
caregivers of adults who provide help with at least one ADL increased from 50% in 2004 to 
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Modern long-term care policy has pivoted to better serve care recipients’ 
preferences and autonomy by financing care in home settings instead of in 
institutional ones. In concept, this shift is positive because it enables people 
with disabilities to live as they wish. But the laser focus on risk from the care-
recipient perspective has overshadowed attention to competing risks, 
including those faced by family and friends.122 Under the auspices of serving 
the best interests of individuals with disabilities, the law has cemented and 
intensified responsibility for their friends and family—their next friends. 
II.  REIMAGINING LONG-TERM CARE RISK FROM THE NEXT-FRIEND 
PERSPECTIVE      
What if we instead considered long-term care risk from the perspective 
of the closest friends and family of someone who is chronically ill or 
disabled? From this perspective, the possibility of becoming responsible for 
another’s long-term care can pose a major threat to an individual or family’s 
security and wellbeing. 
Long-term care law and social policy has left gaping holes. Family and 
friends—“next friends”—have filled these gaps, most often by providing 
long-term care themselves, in part because in most cases no other good option 
exists. This tradition of long-term care as a private obligation is not new. But 
the world has changed in ways that make de facto reliance on friends and 
family increasingly untenable. Even if someone cares for another willingly, 
and even if she derives deep pleasure from it, she often does so at a high cost 
to herself. Whatever the friend or family member was engaged in before—be 
it paid employment, raising a family, getting an education, serving her 
community, nurturing a new relationship, or building a business—will be put 
on hold and possibly abandoned altogether. For many, this disruption takes a 
significant toll.  
Legal scholarship has approached this problem in two ways. Health, 
elder, and disability law and policy scholars generally think of long-term care 
as an insurance problem. However, this literature treats care-recipient risk as 
the sole, or primary, insurable risk.123 Some scholars acknowledge the burdens 
                                                                                                                
58% in 2009”). 
122 Cf. ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY 31 (Mark Ritter trans., 1992) (describing how the emphasis 
on some risks can serve to overshadow others). 
123 See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 73; Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Disabled Kids and Their 
Moms: Caregivers and Horizontal Equity, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 43 (2012) 
(analyzing the Department of Veterans Affairs’ caregiver program in order to highlight the lack 
of public services that benefit caregivers of disabled children); Thomas P. Gallanis & Josephine 
Gittler, Family Caregiving and the Law of Succession: A Proposal, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
761 (2012) (proposing to amend succession law to provide an elective share to a family 
member who was a primary caregiver, providing unpaid informal care to an elderly decedent); 
Christopher C. Jennings & Christopher J. Dawe, Long-Term Care: The Forgotten Health Care 
Challenge: Leading the Way to Broader Reform, 17 STAN. L & POL’Y REV. 57 (2006) (arguing 
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faced by informal caregivers and advocate for policies that offer better 
support, compensation, or more accommodating workplaces.124 But even these 
scholars presume, explicitly or implicitly, continued reliance on family care in 
ways that ensconce it.   
Second, there is a rich and complex literature by feminist legal scholars 
focused on caregiving. The main thrust of this work has been to highlight the 
undervaluation and gendered nature of care work, mostly with regard to 
childcare125 and to a lesser extent long-term care.126 Scholars in this tradition 
                                                                                                                
for a private-public financing method for long-term care); Richard L. Kaplan, Honoring Our 
Parents: Applying the Biblical Imperative the Context of Long-Term Care, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 483 (2007) (proposing that Medicare pay for all nursing home care and 
that any home care remain private responsibility); Marshall Kapp, Home and Community-Based 
Long Term Services and Supports: Health Reform’s Most Enduring Legacy?, 8 ST. LOUIS U. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 9 (2014) (describing the shift to home- and community-based care); 
Daniela Kraiem, Consumer Direction in Medicaid Long Term Care: Autonomy, 
Commodification of Family Labor, and Community Resilience, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 671 (2011) (critiquing consumer-directed long-term care programs for effects on 
paraprofessional and family care workers and arguing for better supports for caregivers); 
Watson, supra note 12 (providing a history of long-term care policy and a critique of 
Medicaid’s institutional bias). 
124 See, e.g., Czapanskiy, supra note 123, at 65-71 (proposing equity between state support for 
parents providing long-term care for children and the Department of Veterans Affairs’ support 
for family caregivers); Gallanis & Gittler, supra note 123 (proposing to amend succession law 
to provide an elective share to a family member who was a primary caregiver); Richard L. 
Kaplan, Federal Tax Policy and Family-Provided Care for Older Adults, 25 VA. TAX REV. 509 
(2005) (advocating for tax credits for family caregivers); Carol Levine, Home Sweet Hospital: 
The Nature and Limits of Private Responsibilities for Home Health Care, 11 J. HEALTH & 
AGING 341, 349-52 (1999) (proposing various supports for family caregivers, including more 
leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, hospice funding, and home care benefits to 
supplement family care).  
125 This body of work is larger than what I could possibly capture here. See, e.g., ALSTOTT, NO 
EXIT, supra note 22 (claiming that society owes an obligation to parents to help preserve their 
autonomy in exchange for the “no exit” obligation that they provide continuity of care for their 
children and make the sacrifices necessary to do so); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE 
AUTONOMY MYTH 38 (2004) (“Justice demands that society recognize that caretaking labor 
produces a good for the larger society. Equality demands that this labor must not only be 
counted, but also valued, compensated, and accommodated by society and its institutions . . . 
.”); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO 
DO ABOUT IT (2000) (arguing for a joint-property proposal to value caregiving work in the 
home); Paula England & Nancy Folbre, Who Should Pay for the Kids?, 563 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 194 (1999) (contending that children are a public good and thus we should all 
help pay for the costs of raising them); Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A 
Proposal for Valuing Women’s Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. 
REV. 17 (arguing for premarital security agreements as a way of valuing women’s domestic 
work and ensuring them compensation in the case of divorce); Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work, 
Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249 (1983) (showing that 
labor and welfare policy both prevent women from working outside the home and undervalue 
the work they do within it); Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 1 (2005) (defending paid leave as a way to increase women’s workforce participation); 
Katherine B. Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1 
(1996) (showing how the law devalues domestic labor); Noah Zatz, Supporting Workers by 
Accounting for Care, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 45(2011) (arguing that we count childcare as 
part of the basket of goods for income-based programs and family caretaking as a form of work 
for benefits contingent on working).  
126 Peggie Smith focuses explicitly on elder care, which she calls the “work-family issue of the 
21st Century.” Peggie Smith, Elder Care, Gender, and Work: The Work-Family Issue of the 
21st Century, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 351, 351 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Elder Care]. 
Others address both childcare and long-term care together. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 124 
(describing all care work as the source of derivative dependency); Lester, supra note 124 
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have made compelling arguments for state support of caregiving based on the 
idea of caregiving as a public responsibility, 127  a public good, 128  a basic 
household need,129 or in order to help preserve women’s attachment to the 
workplace.130 
This Article offers a reframing of the problem of long-term care that 
speaks to both groups. To the first, it suggests we consider next-friend risk a 
coequal, insurable risk of long-term care. Elucidating the possible economic 
and social harms a presumptive caregiver could face reveals a problem with 
the way that current policies steer some people into caregiving roles at the 
expense of other roles. Proposals to support informal caregivers privilege 
women’s private caregiving at the expense of their long-term security and 
engagement in important realms outside of the home. Any solution to the 
problem must correct for this overvaluation. 
To the feminist legal scholars, this Article offers a way of articulating the 
costs caregivers face as a manifestation of a coherent social risk and frames 
the state’s responsibility in terms of risk spreading.131 Focusing on long-term 
care, instead of childcare more broadly, lends to this approach. The 
responsibility for someone else’s long-term care is generally less predictable 
and more skewed in duration and intensity than typical childcare needs. 
Resulting costs fundamentally undermine caregivers’ financial, emotional, 
and physical wellbeing.132  
Thinking about these costs in terms of social risk does not require 
someone to believe that care is a normative good or that society owes any 
obligation to people who do it well (even though a belief that these costs arise 
in service of doing something that we value can enhance a claim to shared 
resources). So long as enough people have experienced or worry about the 
possibility of becoming responsible for an aging parent, an ill spouse, or a 
child with a disability, they can relate to it as a commonly shared threat to 
security.  
                                                                                                                
(offering a normative argument for paid leave for childcare and eldercare); ALSTOTT, NO EXIT, 
supra note 22 (discussing caregiving for children with disabilities). Peggie Smith’s work also 
examines long-term care from a labor perspective, showing how the devaluation of care work 
equally affects formal long-term caregivers. See Peggie Smith, Home Sweet Home? Workplace 
Casualties of Consumer-Directed Home Care for the Elderly, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 537 (2007) [hereinafter Smith, Home Sweet Home]; Peggie Smith, Aging and 
Caring in the Home: Regulating Paid Domesticity in the Twenty-First Century, 92 IOWA L. 
REV. 1835 (2007). There is also a rich body of work on informal caregiving and long-term care 
by sociologists, historians, economists. E.g., EMILY ABEL, WHO CARES FOR THE ELDERLY? 
(1991); BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 31; HARTOG, supra note 29.  
127 See ALSTOTT, NO EXIT, supra note 22. 
128 See FINEMAN, supra note 125; England & Folbre, supra note 125. 
129 See Zatz, supra note 125. 
130 See Lester, supra note 125. 
131 Some scholars advocate for more circumscribed social insurance solutions, including Anne 
Alstott in the chapters of No Exit focused on parents caring for a child with disability and 
Gillian Lester with regard to paid leave to enable workers to take a leave for family care. 
ALSTOTT, NO EXIT, supra note 22; Lester, supra note 125. But none has intended to articulate a 
coherent theory of risk for all long-term caregivers nor to justify a comprehensive solution.  
132 Anne Alstott argues that even more routine childcare can do the same. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT, 
supra note 22. 
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This Part examines what it would mean if, instead of deeming 
responsibility for long-term care as a private obligation, we treated the 
potential for becoming responsible for another as next-friend risk. Imagining 
next-friend risk could justify a fundamental change in how the state finances 
long-term care.  
A.  Long-Term Care as a Private Obligation  
To conceive of a coherent idea of next-friend risk, it is necessary to 
identify who bears this risk and how it arises. These questions are complex 
because the obligation to care for someone is not inscribed in any one place, 
but rather is communicated through social norms and ethical beliefs, and 
sometimes through the law. The many sources that generate this obligation do 
not, however, diminish its veracity; quite the opposite, they mutually reinforce 
it, so that few people choose to walk away from a family member or friend in 
need of long-term care. 
It is not always clear ex ante who will take responsibility for another’s 
care. One expert writes: “Family responsibility is an amorphous concept, with 
fluid boundaries and interpretation. It may derive from religious teachings, 
cultural tradition, emotional bonds, gratitude for past acts, or a sense of 
obligation apart from love.”133 Regardless of why, the reality is that friends 
and family provide long-term care even at significant costs to themselves and 
even when not legally obligated to do so—prompting one scholar to call them 
“trapped kin.”134  
1.  Social Norms and Long-Term Care 
Two different categories of arguments are proffered to explain why 
family members provide long-term care for each other. One view is that 
family care occurs because some people (usually women) have a “natural” 
inclination or a preference for caregiving. Thus, they and others are best off 
when they engage in caregiving, instead of other pursuits. In the past several 
decades, however, arguments in this vein have been challenged and 
discredited as tautological and often in service of certain political and 
economic goals.135 Although many of us have a desire to care for those closest 
                                               
133 Levine, supra note 124, at 344.  
134 HARTOG, supra note 29, at 278. 
135 See Rhonda J. Montgomery, The Family Role in the Context of Long-Term Care, 11 J. 
AGING & HEALTH 383, 395 (1999) (discussing studies that discredit this notion). Martha 
Fineman calls this argument “efficiency as exploitation.” FINEMAN, supra note 125, at 44. One 
version of this idea is the human capital theory assertion that women have a comparative 
advantage for caregiving, which rationalizes their specialization in housework and men’s in 
wage-earning work. Gary Becker argues, for example, that women’s disadvantage in the 
workplace stems from specialization in childcare and housework, rather than discrimination. 
GARY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 22 (1981). For a longer discussion of this use of 
human capital theory, its circularity, and studies that disprove it, see Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 
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to us, explaining the decision that some people make to provide long-term 
care for others to be the result of rational choice or efficient specialization is 
unsatisfying, considering that in most cases it is the only option.  
A second view is that norms—moral, religious, social, cultural, or legal—
and institutions shape a strong notion of individual, typically gendered 
obligation to provide care.136 This is the idea that obligation is constructed in 
part or whole. As Martha Fineman has described, “[C]hoice occurs within the 
constraints of social conditions, including history and tradition. Such 
traditions funnel individual decision making into prescribed channels, often 
operating along practical and symbolic lines to limit and close down 
options.”137 She describes how everything from outdated historical traditions, 
to negative media attention on nannies or daycare, to the structure of the 
public school system with short school days and summer recesses create 
biases toward private caregiving. 138  Others have examined how sex 
discrimination in the workplace,139 laws that do not tax the value of household 
labor,140 and marriage and divorce laws141 all create incentives for women to 
choose caregiving for family over other work. Fully describing the social 
norms and institutions that shape such decisions is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but a few brief illustrations specific to long-term care illuminate how 
a sense of obligation might be communicated or reinforced.142  
As with childcare, women disproportionately provide long-term care. 
Gendered caregiving norms persist even though many women are less well-
situated than many men for the physical labor of long-term care. Gendered 
expectations are shaped by families themselves: a “good” daughter, sister, or 
wife will care for her mother, brother, or husband.143 That said, a significant 
and increasing number of men also provide long-term care.144 The problem 
described herein is at the same time gendered and universal. 
The purpose of family is even reduced, at times, to its role in long-term 
caregiving. The idea is that people have children in part to ensure someone to 
care for them when they get old,145 a phenomenon one scholar describes as 
                                                                                                                
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1893 (2000). 
136 See, e.g., Amy Ziettlow & Naomi Cahn, The Honor Commandment: Law, Religion, and the 
Challenge of Elder Care, 30 J.L. & RELIGION 229 (2015) (examining through qualitative 
empirical research how the Judeo-Christian “honor commandment” influences adult children’s 
engagement in their parents’ elder care). 
137 FINEMAN, supra note 125, at 41.  
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139 See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex 
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990). 
140 See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO L.J. 1571, 1589 (1995). 
141 See Anne L. Alstott, Private Tragedies? Family Law as Social Insurance, 4 HARV. L. & 
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142 For a concise discussion of this idea, see Montgomery, supra note 135, at 384-90. 
143 Historically, such requests were often accompanied by promises of property or another 
bequest. HARTOG, supra note 29, at 274-75. 
144 See Jennifer L. Wolff & Judith D. Kasper, Caregivers of Frail Elders: Updating a National 
Profile, 46 GERONTOLOGIST 344, 348 (2006). 
145 See generally HARTOG, supra note 29 (discussing the complex and changing relationship 
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“an efficient self-insurance strategy adopted by families.”146 To address the 
problem of elderly with unmet care needs, he even proposes taxing the aged 
without children for externalizing costs onto the public system and adopting 
measures to increase fertility, particularly in the case of childless families.147 
Medical practitioners often reinforce the concept of obligation to family 
care. One long-term care expert describes her experience after her husband 
became disabled in an accident, and a nurse foisted her husband’s soiled pants 
on her, stating: “Take these away. Laundry is your job.”148 She also describes 
being labeled a “selfish wife” by a social worker, who was trying to discharge 
her husband from the hospital, for her refusal to take him home before she had 
established professional home care.149 This view presumes that regardless of 
her work or other obligations her care for her husband should come first.150 
The law reinforces the norm of familial long-term care, in both implicit 
and explicit ways. The evolution of long-term care policy in Part I illustrates 
an implicit way that legal institutions rest on the expectations that friends and 
family will provide care. Medicaid long-term care benefits with gaps would be 
untenable if family and friends did not step in to fill these gaps. Sometimes 
obligations in the law are more explicit. For example, until recently, Medicare 
only covered hospice care if the beneficiary had a primary caregiver in place 
(typically a family member). 151  For certified home health agencies, the 
availability of family care at home is still a chief consideration in opening a 
case to authorize Medicare-reimbursed home care.152  
Explicit legal obligations, even though largely dormant now, have helped 
shape expectations of private caregiving. All states have filial support laws, 
modeled on English Poor Laws of 1601, which create explicit obligations to 
pay for care for indigent family members.153 Over half of the states’ laws 
require adult children to care for or financially support indigent parents.154 
Although enforcement of these laws has waned since the New Deal’s creation 
of a social safety net, they can nonetheless still shape social expectations, 
                                                                                                                
between increasingly aged parents and their children).  
146 Douglas A. Wolf, The Family as Provider of Long-Term Care: Efficiency, Equity, and 
Externalities, 11 J. AGING & HEALTH 360, 368-69 (1999) (elaborating on a theoretical model 
developed by Mark Pauly).  
147 Id. at 373-74. 
148 Carol Levine, The Loneliness of the Long-Term Caregiver, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1587, 
1588 (1999). Such a statement is also a reflection of the historical conflict between providers of 
medical and non-medical care over status and role. 
149 Id.  
150 Research shows that medical professionals offer greater supports to male caregivers and 
express lower expectations for them to provide care directly. See Montgomery, supra note 135, 
at 392. 
151 See Levine, Home Sweet Hospital, supra note 124, at 349.  
152 See Levine, supra note 68, at 315-16. 
153 See Pearson, supra note 48, at 270; see also Sande L. Buhai, Parental Support of Adult 
Children with Disabilities, 91 MINN. L. REV. 710, 717-20 (2007) (describing the modern 
development of familial support obligations for disabled adult children and how these 
obligations in some ways resemble the original English Poor Laws). 
154 Pearson, supra note 48, at 278. 
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especially if periodically revived. Despite lying dormant for a while, filial 
support laws have been invoked again in recent years in several states, 
including in cases requiring adult children to reimburse a parent’s medical155 
and nursing home expenses.156 These laws might be revived more frequently 
as Baby Boomers impose higher costs on state Medicaid programs.157 As late 
as the early twentieth century, many states passed laws that obligated parents 
to care for adult children with disabilities—in some cases only if the disability 
developed when the child was still a minor and, in others, even if a grown 
child became disabled later in life.158  
Common law has also defined the boundaries of family caregiving 
obligations. Historian Hendrik Hartog has documented the evolution of legal 
standards for elder care in the mid-nineteenth to twentieth century at a time 
when, as he describes, free market opportunities were seen as emancipating 
adult children from their parents.159 During this period, as they aged, people 
used their estates, especially property, to bargain for care by family members, 
and “contract created or re-created the family as a corporate unit.”160 What 
had once been outside of the zone of commodification—tending to a family 
member—became a bargaining chip for payment or property. Probate 
decisions at times deemed a potential beneficiary more deserving of 
inheritance if she fulfilled a promise to care for her aging parents.161 These 
cases defined the level of care that was expected from family by establishing 
what was above this level and could thus count as legally enforceable 
consideration.162  
Even in light of an overall trend of decreasing legal presumptions of 
obligation, important exceptions reflect lingering gendered expectations. For 
example, Hartog describes that litigation requesting fair compensation for care 
work required a showing of “exceptional” work; somehow the care work by 
men was usually perceived as more exceptional than that by women.163 This 
idea that care is not exceptional (and thus requires no compensation) when 
done by women arises even in modern cases, such as the 1993 California case 
Borelli v Brusseau.164 The court found a wife’s agreement to provide intensive 
care for her disabled husband at home in return for a promise of part of his 
estate as without consideration. 165  As the dissent in Borelli argues 
                                               
155 See Savoy v. Savoy, 641 A.2d 596, 600 (Pa. Supr. Ct. 1994); Prairie Lakes Health Care Sys., 
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156 See Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066, 1077 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); Health Care 
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160 Id. at 32. 
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162 Id. at 66. 
163 Id. at 257-58. 
164 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Ct. App. 1993). But cf. O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 715-16 
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contract of marriage does not constitute a new consideration supporting the indebtedness 
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(emphatically), this court’s decision, relying on precedent from 1937 and 
1941, was out of sync both doctrinally and with late twentieth-century social 
norms.166 Nevertheless, it is an example of lingering articulation of the norm 
that women in kinship relationships are expected to provide long-term care 
and thus should neither expect nor receive anything, financial or otherwise, in 
return. 
In one case, a California court ordered parents to pay $3500 a month to a 
fifty-year old son who became disabled after nearly two decades of work as a 
lawyer.167 In an attempt to ensure that poor people with disabilities get needed 
care, and also that they do not become a public expense, the law has expressly 
obligated family members to serve as caregivers.  
Gendered notions of familial obligation surface explicitly at times in 
policymaking as well, leaving little to the imagination in terms of what drives 
policy decisions. In congressional hearings on home health care, 
Representative Tom Coburn suggested that paid care is inappropriate when a 
family member could provide it. He attempted to illustrate the inefficiency of 
government-funded home care by criticizing the fact that a diabetic patient 
was using publicly financed caregivers despite the fact that his “wife was a 
nurse, trained to measure sugars and give injections.” 168  Coburn’s 
presumption was that the wife should take on the role of his caregiver, nursing 
her husband, rather than others, as her job.  
What is clear is that these various expressions of social expectations for 
family care, even if waning somewhat in recent years, can influence the way 
people respond when a family member or friend is in need of long-term care. 
Sociologist Sandra Levitsky found that among unpaid family caregivers, most 
discussed their own circumstances—even when precarious—in “legitimating” 
terms as their responsibility and duty.169 Most informal caregivers struggled to 
imagine a state role in long-term care, unless they had personally observed 
how Medicaid could cushion the burden of caregiving.170 The bottom line is 
that a complex set of social and legal norms have shaped expectations that 
family and friends, especially women, will provide long-term care.    
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166 Id. at 22 (Poché., J., dissenting). 
167  See Petition to Enforce Parental Duty to Support Adult Indigent Child, Culp v. Culp, 
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170 See id. at 578-79. 
REIMAGINING THE RISK OF LONG-TERM CARE 
2.  The Numbers on Informal Caregiving  
The manifestation of a sense of private obligation is readily evident in the 
number of people who take on responsibility for the long-term care of another 
and the intensity of the care they provide. By one estimate, over forty million 
people provided some unpaid assistance to someone with functional or 
cognitive limitations in 2013.171 One study of Baby Boomers caring for their 
parents found that the percentage of people providing basic personal care to 
parents more than tripled between 1994 and 2008.172 Most informal caregivers 
care for family, primarily for parents but also for grandparents, siblings, 
spouses, and children.173 Yet, estimates suggest that as many as one-fifth of 
informal caregivers provide care for a non-relative, including eleven percent 
for a friend,174 illustrating how obligation reaches beyond narrow definitions 
of family.  
Two-thirds of informal caregivers are women.175 Gendered differences 
exist beneath the surface as well. For example, when compared to sons caring 
for parents, daughters tend to provide more hours of care, engage in more care 
tasks, and more often live with the parent. 176  Furthermore, as care needs 
intensify, daughters more often continue caregiving than sons, who hire out 
care.177 The average age of an informal caregiver is forty-eight years old.178 
This means that the burden of providing informal long-term care especially 
affects women during years that are critical for careers and, increasingly, for 
raising children as the average maternal age rises.179  
Differences in rates of long-term caregiving exist also across race and 
income, although they are not as stark. The prevalence of informal caregiving 
is highest in Hispanic and African-American households and lowest in Asian-
American ones, in part driven by disparate levels of need. 180  Informal 
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172 METLIFE, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 18, at 7.  
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caregivers are disproportionately low-income: one study estimates 44 percent 
of working age caregivers are in households below 200 percent of the federal 
poverty level, as compared with 33 percent of non-caregivers.181  
The variation in informal caregiving is significant, measured both in 
duration and in intensity of care. On average, the duration of caregiving is 4.6 
years, skewed upward by the 3 in 10 caregivers who provide care for five 
years or more.182 The average caregiver provides just over twenty hours of 
care per week, but thirteen percent of people provide forty hours or more of 
care per week.183 Over fifty percent of informal caregivers provide assistance 
with at least one activity of daily living, most often transferring or getting 
dressed, and all with at least one instrumental activity of daily living, such as 
housework, grocery shopping, or preparing meals.184  
Changes in medicine and medical reimbursement have increased the 
intensity of informal care.185 Medicare reform in 1983 reduced payment for 
care in hospital settings, leading to what is often called “quicker and sicker” 
discharge.186 Sociologist Cameron Macdonald calls these policies “healthcare 
offloading” because of the way that they shift the burden of care from medical 
institutions to families.187  
As a result, informal caregivers report providing higher-intensity levels of 
care.188 One study found that over forty percent of informal caregivers were 
performing at least one medical task, including wound care, intravenous 
medication, and operating dialysis and home infusion machines.189 Some of 
the equipment involved is complex, including connecting ventilators to 
tracheostomy sites, responding to alarms and failures, programming feeding 
tubes and monitoring for blockages or signs of infection, and noting medical 
complications quickly, including signs of pneumonia. 190  Most informal 
caregivers have little or no training and provide care in a home setting with no 
help from paid aides, housekeepers, or others.191 One-quarter said they were 
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185 See generally Sara M. Moorman & Cameron Macdonald, Medically Complex Care and 
Caregiver Strain: Results from the Cash and Counseling Demonstration and Evaluation Study, 
53 GERONTOLOGIST 417 (2012) (describing the increase of medicalization of home care and its 
effects on family caregivers).  
186  REDFOOT & HOUSER, supra note 101, at 8 (describing the creation of the Medicare 
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performing medical tasks because their care recipient had been sent home “too 
soon,” and one in eight reported being aware of a mistake they had made in 
medical management, showing that this higher-intensity care puts family 
caregivers in a vulnerable position where they may make errors that harm a 
loved one. 192  Not surprisingly, the negative health, financial, social, and 
professional impact is greater among caregivers who assist in health care 
activities. 193  
As one informal caregiver and scholar described: “I feel abandoned by a 
health care system that commits resources and rewards to rescuing the injured 
and the ill but then consigns such patients and their families to the black hole 
of chronic ‘custodial’ care.”194 What next friends do for others is herculean, 
both in terms of the time spent and the ways that they offer assistance.  
B.  Obligation in a Changing World 
The world has changed in ways that make this type of intense, private 
obligation untenable. Long-term care needs are growing with the shifting 
demographics of the population. Medical advances are keeping people alive 
longer and sicker. In 2009, the life expectancy at birth for an American was 
nearly seventy-nine years, ten years longer than it was in the mid-twentieth 
century and twenty years longer than the beginning of the twentieth 
century.195 Heroic trauma care and miracle drugs are preserving and extending 
lives of people with serious injury.196 And the number of “old old” is growing 
as a percentage of the population.197 More Americans suffer from chronic 
disease than ever before, and some studies suggest the proportion of 
Americans with chronic conditions may continue to rise. 198  Plus, rates of 
childhood disability have increased as much as sixteen percent from 2001 to 
2010.199  
As the Baby Boomers transition from the caregiving to the care-receiving 
generation, the probability of caring for an aging family member or friend is 
increasing. The ratio of people in need of care to potential caregivers is 
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increasing as people live longer and have fewer kids, translating into a higher 
likelihood that any one individual will become responsible for another.200 
At the same time, family and community are evolving in ways that 
destabilize the provision of informal caregiving in households. A higher 
percentage of women are in the labor force than ever before: from one-third in 
1950 to nearly two-thirds at the beginning of the twenty-first century.201 The 
frequency of single-parent households has also risen, from twenty percent in 
1980202 to thirty-four percent in 2011.203 And for households where there is a 
married couple, the percentage in which both spouses work out of the home 
increased from just over forty-four percent in 1967 to sixty percent at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century.204  
At one time, people lived in communities where they could share care 
obligations, but people are leaving their communities more often than before. 
In 2010, 41 percent of Americans lived outside the state in which they were 
born, as compared to 26.5 percent in 1950.205 Sixty-three percent of adults 
have moved to a new community at least once in their lives, while only thirty-
seven percent have never left their hometowns.206  
All of these changes make the burdens that have been shouldered 
privately increasingly untenable for many, exposing long-term caregiving 
because it no longer folds quietly into the familial fabric. The combination of 
law and policies that move care back into the home, in addition to the 
changing home environments, has resulted in costs too significant to ignore.  
C.  The Cost of Private Obligation: The Invisible Copayment  
When someone becomes responsible for another’s long-term care, the 
burdens can be high.207 Some of these burdens can be quantified in monetary 
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terms. Others, even if not easily measurable financially, are no less harmful, 
including damage to intimate relationships or health and an inability to pursue 
life goals. These costs are, in effect, the invisible copayment of current long-
term care social insurance programs.  
It is normatively and empirically difficult to put a value on the invisible 
copayment. 208  As noted above one conservative estimate of replacement 
wages for the hours of informal caregiving for adults in 2013, when valued at 
average caregiving wages of $12.51 per hour, is $470 billion. 209  Other 
estimates that measure that costs instead as opportunity costs to informal 
caregivers are similar in magnitude.210 For a subset of informal caregivers, 
who leave or reduce work to provide care, the total financial losses can be 
staggering. The average informal caregiver who leaves the workforce to care 
for a parent faces losses including foregone income, pensions, earned interest, 
benefits, and retirement benefits, including Social Security. One study 
estimates these losses to be $300,000, on average, and others estimate them to 
be as high as $600,000 for some caregivers.211  For someone caring for a 
parent who reduces working hours but does not leave a job, studies estimate 
average losses still near $200,000.212 Among all informal caregivers twenty 
percent take a leave of absence.213 More than one-third of those caring for 
their parents leave the workforce or reduce working hours.214 Considering that 
the median household net worth was just under $70,000 in 2011,215 losses at 
this level are devastating for all but the wealthiest households. An estimate of 
the aggregate costs of Baby Boomers caring for their parents, measured in lost 
wages, Social Security, and pension, is nearly $3 trillion dollars. 216  Not 
surprisingly, one-third of caregivers report moderate to high financial hardship 
due to caregiving.217  
Because of its gendered nature, informal caregiving contributes to wage 
and employment gaps.218 Women are more likely than men to disrupt or leave 
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work for caregiving.219 Evidence shows that extended periods of leave from 
work significantly hamper professional advancement.220 Even those who stay 
in the workplace are unlikely to be able to perform as strongly as those not 
providing long-term care. Long-term caregivers are twice as likely to miss six 
or more days of work than non-caregivers.221 By one estimate, U.S. businesses 
experience nearly $30 billion a year in lost productivity from full-time 
employees who are caring for family because of absenteeism, distraction, and 
reduced hours.222 Employers pay about eight percent more for health care for 
employees who care for an older person, totaling over $13 billion per year.223 
Employers are, in turn, less likely to invest in employees who provide long-
term care.224  
Informal caregiving can contribute to a cycle of poverty, especially since 
informal caregivers are more likely to be in low-income households. 225 
Political scientist Joe White describes: “Reliance on intra-family transfers 
carries the same risks as personal investments, especially since individuals 
with low incomes tend to have children with low incomes, and so a parent’s 
misfortune would be doubly visited upon his or her children.”226 To the extent 
someone depletes her resources or forgoes savings and retirement benefits to 
care for another, she will be less likely to be able to afford care for herself 
later if needed. Thus, family caregiving can solidify class lines as each 
generation sacrifices its financial security for another one. 
Quantifying harm only in terms of hours of unpaid care or lost income, 
however, does not begin to capture the impact of informal caregiving on 
people’s lives. A considerable body of research measures “secondary strains,” 
including effects on “family and occupational role and social and recreational 
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activities, and intrapsychic strains such as loss of self-esteem, loss of self, role 
captivity, and lowered sense of competence.” 227  This research documents 
significant health effects and psychosocial and behavioral impacts. The self-
reported health of informal caregivers is worse than that of non-caregivers, 
and it declines the longer someone provides care.228 In one study, over two-
thirds of respondents reported that long-term caregiving was the top source of 
stress in their lives.229 Research has shown that forty to seventy percent of 
people caring for older adults have symptoms of depression and twenty-five to 
fifty percent meet diagnostic criteria for major depression, far outpacing the 
rates in the general population.230 Significantly, health status is worse for an 
informal caregiver who felt she had no choice in whether to provide care.231  
Even beyond measurable physical and psychosocial harms, taking 
responsibility for the long-term care of another, especially for someone who 
requires prolonged intensive care, can consume life in ways difficult to 
quantify but nonetheless important. Long-term care responsibility can harm 
existing relationships or create barriers to entering into new intimate 
relationships. Anne Alstott has argued that social policy should be just as 
concerned about a wider range of risks that can threaten wellbeing and 
security, which she refers to as disruptions in “affective life.”232 In one study, 
one-half of caregivers reported sacrificed time with friends and family.233  
An informal caregiver could lose the chance to engage in other activities 
that define her, fulfill her, or create future opportunity for her. Both because of 
the economic insecurity it can create and equally because of the way it can 
absorb a great proportion of someone’s time and mental space, responsibility 
for another’s long-term care can impede pursuit of one’s life goals—what 
some call self-determination, self-actualization,234 or engagement in “the life 
of a civilized being.”235 Although more difficult to measure, these harms are 
nonetheless devastating.  
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228 NAT’L ALLIANCE, CAREGIVING, supra note 80, at 47. One-third of caregivers report moderate 
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DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE 12, 14 (Family Caregiver Alliance ed., 2006).  
231 NAT’L ALLIANCE, CAREGIVING, supra note 80, at 20-21, 50 (43 percent of caregivers report 
feeling this way, half of whom serve as a primary caregiver). 
232 Alstott, supra note 141, at 5.  
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In sum, even if people take on caring for another with great generosity 
and love, long-term care is extremely demanding. Even in the best of 
circumstances, it will take a toll.  
D.  Reimagining Private Obligation as Social Risk  
What if we reimagine these costs as the result of next-friend risk, rather 
than an individual obligation? Long-term care clearly undermines the security 
of modern American families and can be understood as a source of risk for 
next friends.  
What does it mean for something to be a “risk”? Technical definitions 
describe risk in actuarial terms as a probabilistic harm from a particular 
hazard.236 Next-friend risk clearly fits this conception. Most of us could end 
up responsible for the long-term care for another, even if not all of us will. 
The costs that result are stochastic, skewed, and, in the worst cases, 
devastating.237 Responsibility is only triggered when illness or injury affects a 
family member or friend, rarely due to the fault of a next friend, as examined 
in more detail below. Even if someone finds providing long-term care for a 
loved one rewarding, it is not a role that most people anticipate and 
embrace.238 Taking an ex ante, collective view, the possibility of responsibility 
for the long-term care of another shares many attributes with other phenomena 
that we have treated as serious social risks—from workplace injury to the 
potential of poverty in old age from outliving ones savings.  
Yet not all probabilistic harms are considered and treated as salient social 
risks. Sociocultural risk scholars examine how what a society defines as risk is 
socially mediated.239 French historian and philosopher François Ewald takes 
                                               
236  E.g., FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 19-20, 224-25, 231-32 (1921) 
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236, at 131; François Ewald, Insurance and Risk, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT 197 (Graham 
Burchell et al. eds., 1991); Ewald, supra note 24; Steve Rayner, Cultural Theory and Risk 
Analysis, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds. 1992); see 
also BAKER & SIMON, supra note 23; DEBORAH LUPTON, RISK (1999) (providing an overview of 
different schools of sociocultural risk scholarship). Social typically is used to refer to society at 
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an especially relativist stance: “anything can be a risk; it all depends on how 
one analyzes the danger, considers the event.”240 Unlike Ewald, most scholars 
in this tradition believe that some measurable danger underlies what we see as 
risk.241 In other words, risk is both objective and socially mediated. This way 
of defining risk explains why even if a hazard is not presently thought of as a 
social risk, it does not mean it could and should not be. Calling a phenomenon 
“risk” signals two things: that it causes probabilistic harm and also that it is 
salient as such. 
Certain harms have greater salience as risky, based on how they are 
framed, by whom, and with what agenda in mind. Sociologist Ulrich Beck 
describes an “overproduction of risks,” when interested parties magnify some 
risks in order to, in turn, diminish concomitant risks. As an example, he 
explains that “the dramatization of climactic consequences ‘minimizes’ the 
risk of nuclear energy.”242 This practice is pervasive. The risk from overly 
aggressive (and perhaps unscrupulous or criminal) banking practices is 
tolerated in light of claims that certain financial institution are “too big to 
fail.”243 In Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, a lawsuit claiming serious 
injury from a generic anti-inflammatory drug, the pharmaceutical company’s 
lawyers highlighted the harm of rising health care costs due to brand-name 
drugs in order to suggest that the low risk that a generic drug would cause 
someone’s skin to burn and slough off, as it did to Karen Bartlett, was not 
unreasonably dangerous.244 A web of interested parties and complex dynamics 
shape the collective concern with certain risks and not with others.245  
However, conceptions of risk can evolve so that something that was 
previously seen as individual cost or misfortune comes to be thought of as a 
salient social risk. John Witt describes this type of transformation behind the 
creation of workman’s compensation.246 Workplace injuries occurred before 
industrialization, but by the end of the nineteenth century they manifested in 
more frequent, more devastating, and more visible ways.247 In light of this 
evolution, advocates worked to transform workplace injury from something 
conceived of as a source of individual misfortune or fault to a risk inherent in 
                                                                                                                
large and cultural to sub-groups within it.  
240 Ewald, supra note 239, at 199.  
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SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 236, at 1, 4-6 (arraying sociocultural risk scholarship ranges 
from realist to relativist).  
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244 See Brief of Petitioner at 4, Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013), 2013 WL 
457382, at *4 (describing the balance Congress sought to strike between cost and safety in the 
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industrialization. This was achieved by framing the injuries as an unavoidable 
threat to the economic security of American families.248 This framing made a 
collective solution seem imperative. In turn, the creation of a collective 
approach to pay for workplace injuries became the springboard for a “new 
conception of social responsibility . . . that aimed not just to spread the risks of 
injury, but also to take on more fundamental risks such as poverty.”249  
The idea of social responsibility to address such risks laid the foundation 
for the New Deal, creating what one scholar characterized as a “palpable 
experience of solidarity that helped underwrite the forms of collectivism that 
were successfully implemented.”250 In fact, risk displaced other justifications 
for state support, as part of what has been described as a modern shift from a 
“welfare society” to a “risk society.”251 Costs understood to be the result of 
uncontrollable threats to family or individual security made a greater claim to 
state resources.252 Redistribution was not the explicitly stated goal; security 
was.  
As other harms were perceived as similar in nature to workplace injury—
unavoidable and significant—they became worthy targets for social 
insurance.253 For example, as hospitals modernized and medical care became 
both more expensive and more effective, the costs of medical care threatened 
American families’ financial security, and insurance for medical care was 
needed to protect the family wage. Medicare and Medicaid were enacted. The 
creation of Social Security was in part based on the recognition that longer 
lives heightened the risk of a family outliving its savings and understanding 
this problem as a collective scourge and not as individual misfortune. Each of 
these challenges that had long been managed mostly privately came to be 
perceived as proper zones of state support.  
In turn, the creation of social insurance to manage a particular harm 
helped to transform the social understanding of these harms from a private 
obligation to a collective concern. Ewald describes that insurance “makes 
risks appear where each person had hitherto felt obligated to submit 
                                               
248 Id. at 129-30 (describing how activist Crystal Eastman transformed the debate of workplace 
accidents from centering on individual fault to “the image of the wounded family”). 
249 Id. at 150. 
250 Simon, supra note 23. 
251 BECK, supra note 124, at 19-20. 
252 See Landis, supra note 24, at 271; LANDIS DAUBER, supra note 24; Ewald, supra note 239, at 
209-10; Ewald, supra note 24, at 281 (“It is a commonplace that, during the twentieth century, 
law and responsibility were transformed, bit by bit, into a legal system of compensation, based 
on risk and insurance.”).  
253 WITT, supra note 24, at 5 (“[T]he industrial-accident crisis introduced to the American legal 
system new ideas and institutions organized around risk, security, and the actuarial categories 
of insurance—ideas and institutions that to this day remain at the heart of much of our law”); 
Landis, supra note 24, at 271 (1999) (“Ultimately, whether or not an event was a ‘calamity’ 
deserving of federal intervention turned upon the ability of the claimants to argue that they, like 
those who previously received aid, were innocent victims of fate rather than irresponsible 
protagonists in their own misery.”). See generally LANDIS DAUBER, supra note 24 (describing 
government indemnification of victims of natural disasters that were considered calamitous and 
unpredictable). 
REIMAGINING THE RISK OF LONG-TERM CARE 
resignedly to the blows of fortune.”254 He calls this transformation the process 
of the “insurantial imaginary,”255 implying that the creation of insurance itself 
affirms a particular harm as risk.  
In recent years, the language of risk has often been coopted by those who 
take the position that it is an individual’s responsibility to manage risk. Risk 
spreading approaches are crumbling under the weight of moral hazard—the 
idea that too much insurance discourages efficient caution.256 Jacob Hacker, in 
The Great Risk Shift, calls this trend the “personal responsibility crusade” and 
shows how it has led to policies that invisibly undercut Americans’ economic 
security.257  As risk has become so strongly associated with this neoliberal 
agenda, some scholars seek a new language to advocate for state policies that 
can increase security.258  
But proponents of social change should not reject the language of risk; it 
has a long history of motivating monumental social policies and in the right 
context could do so again. As Hacker suggests: “Americans may be willing to 
turn a blind eye to growing inequality, confident in the belief that their own 
standard of living is still rising. But economic insecurity strikes at the very 
heart of the American Dream.”259 It leaves even those who have done all the 
right things to achieve a place in the middle class fearful about having the rug 
pulled out from under them.  
The idea of next-friend risk recasts the problem of private obligation for 
long-term care in a more compelling way for the public and for policymakers, 
many of whom worry personally about the possibility of becoming 
responsible for an aging parent, sick spouse, or disabled child. Recognizing 
next-friend risk can transform long-term care from an old-people problem into 
a universal concern. Public long-term care funding has been vulnerable to 
attack as “yet another” transfer from today’s already stretched workers to the 
elderly. If instead we see the problem of long-term care as a threat to people’s 
financial security and health during their prime earning and child-rearing 
years, solving it, in effect, is a transfer to the young, working class. Three-
quarters of informal caregivers are under age sixty five and three-fifths are in 
the labor force.260 In other words, any social resources and tax dollars spent on 
the problem would benefit the primarily working-age next friends as much as 
the care recipients. Seeing long-term care as a problem equally for care 
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recipients and for next friends could broaden coalitions for reform, uniting the 
interests of labor, informal caregivers, older voters, and disability advocates. 
Next-friend risk, however, has been sidelined. The policy focus on long-
term care risk from the care-recipient perspective has served to overshadow 
the concomitant risk to next friends. The laws and policies described in Part I 
have hidden next-friend risk from the public eye, in the home and off the 
balance sheets, by inscribing it as private and individual—unsurprising, given 
the gendered nature of long-term caregiving. The notion that family care is a 
personal, perhaps moral, obligation that people provide willingly is politically 
convenient. It has enabled policymakers to avoid dealing with the full cost of 
long-term care, instead leaving others to experience the costs privately and 
invisibly.  
E.  The Implications of Imagining Next-Friend Risk 
Understanding the possibility of becoming responsible for another as a 
social risk—and not as a private obligation—has at least four major 
substantive implications for long-term care policy.  
First, it changes the scale of the problem. Current social insurance policy 
hides costs borne by next friends. Even considering just the $470 billion 
estimate of the current market value of hours spent caregiving would require 
long-term care funding at triple current Medicaid levels. 261  Although the 
United States spends more per capita than other developed countries on nearly 
every other category of health care, it spends comparatively less on long-term 
care.262 There is good reason to spend more. Even if Medicaid funding is 
unlikely to triple anytime soon, accurate accounting of the size of the problem 
could anchor policymakers on a more realistic number. 
Second, as discussed just above, recognizing the problem of next-friend 
risk highlights its similarity to other problems that have prompted the creation 
of social welfare policy and social insurance to spread risk. At a moment in 
time when individualistic sentiment runs strong, the fact that many people can 
relate personally to next-friend risk could be a boon.263 In other words, people 
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might be motivated out of self-regard to support a solution that offers 
communitarian benefit. More so, where intensive care needs persist over time, 
few Americans could shoulder the burden privately, suggesting the necessity 
of a universal social insurance approach. Universal programs are also more 
popular and less politically vulnerable than means-tested ones, like Medicaid.  
Third, even with an infusion of funding, it is necessary to see the 
problem from the perspective of next friends in order to design policy with the 
flexibility to mitigate the risk they face. Next-friend risk could be mitigated to 
some extent by simply increasing Medicaid funding for long-term care, but 
even a large increase could have limited benefit if not done with an eye 
toward addressing next-friend risk.  
In some cases, the best way to mitigate risk is to make family caregivers 
whole by paying them for caregiving. In others, it is by enabling them not to 
provide care in the first place and thus limit the extent of the negative impact 
on their careers or lives. It is possible to mitigate risk fully from the care-
recipient perspective, but to leave next friends vulnerable by, for example, 
pouring money into current Medicaid programs that have a bias for family 
care. Even if Medicaid compensated all hours of informal care at a fair wage, 
it would perpetuate harm—financial and nonmonetary—for kin who are better 
off in the long run if they do not provide care, but who have no other option. 
Conversely, if a huge infusion of funding were made available only to pay for 
outsourced care, the same would occur. Some people would be unable to find 
a satisfactory way to pay for care and would instead provide care themselves, 
even without pay. Or under some states’ policies, the only outsourcing option 
is nursing home care. Someone unwilling to put a parent in a nursing home, or 
whose parent is unwilling to live in a nursing home, might instead still provide 
care herself. 
When someone becomes responsible for the care of another, she should 
be able to decide whether to provide care herself or to pay someone else to do 
it (or some combination). Insurance must be designed to enable a next friend 
to toggle more freely between these two choices and thus to use benefits in a 
way that minimizes her own insecurity, however she might define it, and to 
balance caring for a family member with other pursuits. Current policy is 
focused so narrowly on care-recipient risk that it does not even see the need 
for this toggle. I discuss in detail below why such a toggle is imperative and 
what it requires. Conceptually, seeing next-friend risk reveals the need for it. 
Fourth, especially if no additional money is spent, understanding next-
friend risk raises the (admittedly uncomfortable) question of whether we 
should think differently about tradeoffs between mitigating care-recipient and 
next-friend risk, even if it means compromise in some cases for the care 
recipient. For example, if an elderly widower has a stroke, the goal of current 
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long-term care law and policy is to protect his autonomy by providing 
adequate support in the least restrictive setting appropriate, as required by 
Olmstead. 264  If his daughter moves him into her home—the solution that 
Medicaid policies for home- and community-based care increasingly 
encourage—this goal could be fully met at the lowest possible public cost. But 
his daughter may have to reduce working hours or leave a secure job with 
benefits, threatening her family’s long-term finances and possibly health and 
wellbeing. Such results, where each generation sacrifices its security for the 
previous one, are simply not sustainable. 
 
*** 
  
As the demands for care are becoming more intense and the structure of 
families is changing, care needs do not fit seamlessly into the household, and 
the risk long-term care poses to next friends is increasingly difficult to ignore. 
When viewed in the aggregate, next-friend risk appears as threatening as the 
risk of disability from the care recipient perspective and as many of the other 
phenomena that have motivated state action. 
No social policy could neutralize all of the harm people experience when 
friends or family need long-term care. It is inevitably painful to see a loved 
one who needs help feeding herself or getting in and out of bed, even if the 
costs of her care are fully compensated. Nor could any policy even ameliorate 
all economic harms. Doing so would be too complex and too expensive. But 
long-term care policy could be designed to minimize next-friend risk better 
than it does today. Considering the risk of long-term care equally from this 
perspective is a first step toward better long-term care policy.  
III.  SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR NEXT-FRIEND RISK 
A.  The Case for Social Insurance for Next-Friend Risk 
Imagining next-friend risk implies that it is something social insurance 
could mitigate. Here, I make the case for why it should. Social insurance 
spreads costs that a society sees as inefficient, undesirable, or unjust for an 
individual to bear. It can be used to promote economic efficiency or address 
private-insurance market failures.265 Social insurance can also “change [the] 
character” of an existing market,266 such as when people cannot afford private 
insurance that would be welfare enhancing,267 for paternalistic reasons, or to 
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advance social justice goals. 268  Social insurance policies that are more 
sensitive to next-friend risk could be more efficient and result in a more just 
distribution of the costs of long-term caregiving. As will be discussed in Part 
IV, these goals could be advanced by a comprehensive social insurance 
program or even just incremental changes to existing social insurance policies.    
Mitigating next-friend risk would serve a core utilitarian goal—to protect 
people from income loss that can undermine economic security.269 Marmor 
and coauthors describe social insurance as “a set of interventions designed to 
reduce the impacts of common threats across each person’s life cycle, threats 
that simply cannot be countered effectively by individual prudence and private 
markets.”270 As explained above, next-friend risk poses precisely this type of 
threat. 
Yet, social policy does not always intervene to make lives more secure, 
even if it could, which raises the question of why next-friend risk should be a 
priority. Family or friends often take responsibility for each other in cases of, 
for example, unemployment, property damage, or unmanageable debt. 
Furthermore, U.S. social welfare policy excludes most caregiving, even 
though spreading the costs of such activity has the potential for significant 
welfare benefits.271  
One possibility is that next-friend risk in the case of long-term care is not 
exceptional, and the state should be equally concerned with costs family face 
in these other situations. Policymakers select out some from among many 
insurable risks.272  From this perspective, what becomes insured is more a 
matter of what suits a social and political moment than any valid comparative 
claim to shared resources. 
Yet, there are also substantive reasons why addressing next-friend risk is 
especially important. As Section II.A described, the social norms for taking 
care of a family member or friend who is physically vulnerable are strong and 
engender sacrifice. It is less expected that a family member would sacrifice 
her own financial security, family, career, or wellbeing to bail a sibling out of 
credit card debt or to bankroll an unemployed child indefinitely. Next-friend 
risk arises in service of something that we expect people to do and that we 
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perceive as a public benefit: providing care for people with serious illness or 
disability.273 
Furthermore, the consequences of not helping a sibling in credit card 
debt are less dire, in part because the law and private insurance already offer 
means for relief. A family member in debt can file for bankruptcy. Someone 
who loses a job can claim unemployment insurance. But in the case of long-
term care, it is nearly impossible for people to meet their needs without 
others’ help, even if they qualify for Medicaid benefits.  
Next-friend risk has higher stakes. Just the possible monetary losses 
outlined above can set a caregiver up for a future with insufficient resources to 
meet her own basic needs. Few ways that family members aid each other 
approach this level of cost and financial insecurity. Addressing next-friend 
risk could thus significantly bolster the financial security of American 
families. 
Social insurance also serves egalitarian goals. John Rawls argued that a 
just distribution of basic resources is defined by the share held by the worst 
off person in society. 274  Social insurance offers protection against the 
depletion of any one individual’s basic resources. Graetz and Mashaw justify 
social insurance in such terms: “Given little information about where they 
would start or end up in the income distribution, it might seem in everyone’s 
interest to agree to the collective provision of affordable . . . insurance in order 
that they all have reasonable protection against foreseeable risks.”275 Anne 
Alstott has expressed a similar goal in “liberal egalitarian” terms. She 
contends that “a central function of the state is to create institutions that 
ensure to every person the conditions of autonomy: the chance to develop the 
capabilities that one needs to formulate, choose, and pursue a vision of the 
good life.”276 Social insurance can serve as such an institution that protects 
conditions of autonomy, in terms of money or time.  
Although people disagree on what particular basic resources or 
conditions are necessary to ensure opportunity,277 it is indisputable, under any 
                                               
273 Simon, supra note 23, at 128, 135. 
274 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 72 (1971); RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 
73 (2000). 
275 GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 24, at 19. 
276 ALSTOTT, NO EXIT, supra note 22, at 35.  
277  Professors Graetz and Mashaw focus on economic resources. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, 
supra note 24, at 19. John Rawls himself names liberty as the foremost primary good. See 
RAWLS, supra note 274, at 214. Norm Daniels extends Rawls’s analysis to health as a condition 
of equality. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH (2007). Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum 
contend that capabilities are better precursors to opportunity because they capture how people 
with various levels of ability actually engage in the world. Martha C. Nussbaum, Long-Term 
Care and Social Justice: A Challenge to Conventional Ideas of the Social Contract, in WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., ETHICAL CHOICES IN LONG-TERM CARE: WHAT DOES JUSTICE REQUIRE? 31 
(2002); Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, The Tanner Lecture on Human Values (May 22, 
1979), http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/s/sen80.pdf. Nussbaum includes goods 
such as “entitlement to leisure for play and the cultivation of one’s faculties, political 
participation, and employment opportunities” among the basic “primary goods.” Nussbaum, 
supra, at 56. 
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definition, that responsibility for another’s long-term care would deplete these 
resources and disrupt such conditions. Just the potential financial losses would 
do so. Yet, long-term caregiving also depletes health and time, which are as 
necessary as money as conditions to pursue life goals. Research shows that 
even those caregivers who see caregiving as part of their purpose in life and 
report personal enrichment from it are no less likely to suffer a loss of 
identity, referred to tellingly as “loss of self” or “role engulfment.”278  
These harms are made especially unjust by the fact that they are borne 
inequitably, especially by women. Their long-term care responsibilities 
exacerbate weaker workplace attachment and the wage gap. Social policy 
sensitive to next-friend risk could promote conditions of autonomy for 
everyone and, in so doing, also reduce the disparate impact of next-friend risk 
on women’s careers, earnings, health, and wellbeing.  
B.  Principles To Guide the Design of Social Insurance for Next-Friend Risk  
Designing social insurance in a way that promotes greater security and 
simultaneously protects a next friend’s ability to make life choices is not 
simple. Imagine if the state were to provide all long-term care in-kind, perhaps 
with the option for either nursing home care or formal caregivers at home. 
This approach could reduce the insecurity that informal caregivers face, by 
taking them out of the business of long-term caregiving altogether. They 
would be free to engage in their professions, child-rearing, civic work, 
education, and leisure activities, as before, and to spend time with a friend or 
family member as they wish but not as the primary caregiver. This approach is 
conceptually simple. Yet, it would be both difficult to implement, at least in 
the short term, and incomplete. Even with the current reliance on family and 
friends, there is a substantial shortage of formal care providers, as discussed 
below. No feasible path forward could cut all family and friends out, 
especially in the short term.  
Further, providing only in-kind benefits would not achieve the goal of 
greater security for everyone.279 Some people would decline an in-kind benefit 
to provide unpaid informal care themselves, either because they want to do so 
or because a family member refuses anything but family care. Even if 
someone deeply values providing care—enough to do it for free when other 
options exist—we might nonetheless want to protect her from experiencing 
insecurity if she chooses to do so, especially if we value caregiving by friends 
and family. In other words, we might not want Mother Teresa to die homeless 
and starving just because she truly preferred to care for others for free.  
                                               
278 Marilyn M. Skaff & Leonard I. Pearlin, Caregiving: Role Engulfment and the Loss of Self, 
32 GERONTOLOGIST 656, 657 (1992). “Loss of self” was found to be more common among 
spouses, women, and younger caregivers. Id. at 660. 
279  It might, however, be a more effective way to achieve other goals, such as stronger 
workplace attachment for women and narrowing the gender gap in the workplace.  
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Likewise, for all of the reasons already articulated, shifting to a system of 
only family care, even if compensated, would not be a good solution either. It 
would require more people to disrupt other pursuits, even when doing so is not 
in their best interests. 
A comprehensive approach must recognize and support the two ways 
that someone could respond to a family member or friend in need—by 
providing or paying for care. The best policies would be designed to allow 
someone to toggle between these two choices, to protect her security and, 
equally, her self-determination.  
One version of a toggle might require social insurance policies that are 
neutral on their face. Policies could allow next friends to use benefits 
interchangeably to provide care or to pay someone else to do so. This 
approach is common in other countries with universal long-term care 
insurance.280  
Each next friend could weigh potential harms and benefits and decide 
how best to minimize her own risk in a context where harms and perceptions 
of harms vary considerably from person to person. For example, imagine a 
daughter is working toward a master’s degree in business or is writing a novel 
when her father has a stroke. She might, on one hand, believe that finishing 
her degree or the novel is the best way to protect her future security or to 
pursue her dreams. Or she might prefer to put these pursuits on hold. More 
facially neutral long-term care policies would at least give her the opportunity 
for such deliberation.  
Furthermore, more flexible policies are sensitive to the complexity of 
factors that go into such decisions, balancing the needs of care recipients and 
their next friends. In some cases, the care recipient might prefer care by a 
friend or family, or family might be better able to address a care-recipient’s 
needs.281 Some studies suggest that treatment outcomes can be better when a 
loved one provides care.282 In other cases, it might not be best for a family 
member to provide care, such as when more specialized care is needed, when 
a parent was or is abusive, or when the parent is reticent to burden family or 
friends with caregiving but willing to accept paid, professional help. In many 
cases, a combination of providing and paying for care might be best. As Carol 
Levine, a prominent long-term care scholar and the primary caregiver for 
seventeen years for her husband, who was paralyzed from the neck down in a 
car accident, aptly describes: “Total self-sacrifice may be ennobled in legend; 
                                               
280 See discussion infra Section IV.A.2 for examples of this approach.  
281 See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 146, at 366-67 (contending that a family member might be better 
positioned to manage money or prepare meals or to generate economies of scale with 
cohabitation). 
282  See, e.g., Joseph E. Gaugler, Family Involvement in Residential Long-Term Care: A 
Synthesis and Critical Review, 9 AGING & MENTAL HEALTH 105, 111 (2005) (reporting that 
family involvement in caregiving has been shown to decrease mortality, infection, and 
hospitalization).  
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it is a decidedly unsatisfactory way to live one’s life and a poor basis for 
public policy.”283 The point is that there is no single right answer on how to 
structure long-term care provision for every circumstance. Policies must be 
designed in a way that creates space for this variability.  
Simply creating an option to outsource care in more cases would change 
the landscape by softening the way that the law currently creates a bias toward 
informal caregiving. As Gillian Lester has explained: “[I]f a state intervention 
makes a choice previously unavailable to some portion of the population 
financially more attractive, the effect will be to encourage individuals on the 
margin toward the new option.”284 We might think of a toggle that creates 
facially neutral policies as a “thin version” of state neutrality. The goal would 
be to strive for policies that do not, in and of themselves, strongly bias 
decisions on how to manage next-friend risk. 
Yet a policy that is neutral on its face would not mean neutral grounds 
for decisionmaking when layered on top of strong preexisting biases toward 
familial care—individual, social, or institutional. A “thick version” of state 
neutrality could provide some counterweight to these biases.  
For example, individuals might underestimate the burdens of long-term 
caregiving and overestimate the benefits.285 People might underestimate the 
long-term effect on career advancement or the many sources of income and 
assets that will be compromised, including health benefits, social security, or 
pensions. They could easily underestimate the length of time care will be 
needed; elderly parents suffer diseases that can persist for many years, yet 
doctors cannot provide good estimates of likely mortality.286 Likewise, next 
friends might suffer from “optimism bias” and overestimate the benefits of 
providing care personally, including psychic rewards, possible inheritance, or 
even the benefit to the care recipient of family providing care.287 Or the horror 
stories about problems that arise in nursing homes might be overly 
influential.288  
Furthermore, the background social norms and social institutions 
discussed in Part II create a non-neutral and self-reinforcing baseline that 
could overly determine decisions, especially decisions women make to 
provide care directly. The historical reliance on family caregiving has limited 
                                               
283 Levine, Home Sweet Hospital, supra note 124, at 348.  
284 Lester, supra note 125, at 6. 
285 Cf. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1471, 1476-79 (1998) (describing the research on bounded rationality—the reasons why actual 
behavior differs from rational behavior); Russell Korobkin & Thomas Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1051 (2000) (outlining empirical evidence inconsistent with the rationality assumption). 
286 Cf. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 285, at 1083 (describing the possibility for suboptimal 
decisionmaking in ambiguous situations). 
287 Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980). 
288 Cf. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 285, at 1100 (describing “anchoring” errors); Jennifer 
Steinhauer, Shock but No Longer Surprise over Nursing Home Problems, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 
2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/09/nyregion/shock-but-no-longer-surprise-over-
nursing-home-problems.html (noting a 30% increase in citations for inadequate care in nursing 
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investment in compelling community-care settings and has atrophied the labor 
force for caregiving, which means that even with nimble policies, it may still 
seem there is no option but to provide care.  
Policies could be designed to be sensitive to and with the aim of 
counterbalancing these preexisting biases.289  At the very least, they could 
make transparent the costs and benefits of different choices to prompt people 
to consider them.290 Medicaid policies could highlight the benefit of care in 
group settings or from formal caregivers, who are often better trained or 
equipped to provide care, and the burdens family face when providing care 
personally. Even more strongly, the law might, for example, be designed to 
discourage untrained next friends from providing care in the hardest cases, 
such as with dementia care, where caregivers report the highest burden.291 
Thus, there are compelling reasons to increase social insurance protections for 
next friends, but actually doing so is no easy task.  
C.  Policymaking and Dynamic Effects 
Just as current policies compel informal caregiving, new policies would 
shape decisions as well, whether intentionally or not. Policymakers try to 
predict individual and social responses to policies—dynamic effects—but are 
not always able to do so perfectly. And these effects might change in response 
to changing social circumstances, requiring iteration over time to achieve 
policy goals.  
In the case of policies aimed to address next-friend risk, social policy 
details could have dramatic effects on workplace participation, the future 
development of long-term care facilities and workforce, and kinship 
relationships. This Section acknowledges such effects by considering one 
especially important policy design question: whether to compensate care a 
next friend provides based on lost income or market caregiving wages. This 
decision in effect gets to the heart of how exactly we conceive of the insurable 
harm—disruption of employment or time spent caregiving—and would have a 
significant impact on an individual’s decision to provide or pay for care. This 
discussion is not intended to solve this question, which has fueled decades of 
feminist debate; rather, I use it to illustrate the importance of policy details.  
                                               
289 See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 
199-201 (2006) (describing use of the law to steer people toward more rational decisions). 
290 This type of informational approach is common in financial literacy efforts. See Allison K. 
Hoffman & Howell E. Jackson, Retiree Out-of-Pocket Healthcare Spending: A Study of 
Consumer Expectations and Policy Implications, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 62, 65-66 (2013) 
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291 JOSHUA M. WIENER ET AL., AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., CONSUMER-DIRECTED HOME CARE IN 
THE NETHERLANDS, ENGLAND, AND GERMANY 15 (2003), 
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/2003_12_eu_cd.pdf. In these cases, relying on 
professional caregivers might be in the best interests of both the care recipient and the next 
friend.  
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The first approach, replacing lost income, captures immediate financial 
harm in a way familiar to American social insurance, which most often 
measures harm as the costs of disruption of paid work.292  This approach, 
however, implies that an at-home parent, a volunteer worker, or an 
unemployed worker, who would not experience immediate loss of income, is 
not harmed.293 It also takes a snapshot view of harm that does not capture the 
cascading effects caregiving might have on someone’s life. If a mother were 
caring for her young children but intending to return to work, added 
responsibility to care for an aging parent or injured spouse could be the final 
straw that prevents her from ever reengaging in paid work.294  Basing benefits 
on potential future lost wages would be pure speculation, even if such losses 
might have been significant. On the other hand, if a corporate executive took 
leave to provide care, social policy would put a high value on the harm, and 
the public costs of doing so would be formidable. The fact that the market 
values some activities more than others would be felt doubly. Social insurance 
policy that views harm only in terms of lost wages would replicate the wage 
gap and undervaluation of women’s work.295 
This approach would have cascading effects. Lower-paid or unemployed 
family members, more likely women, would have less incentive to take on 
caregiving, and they would be paid less when they do. And all else equal, a 
higher earner could more freely make a decision to provide care with less 
financial sacrifice.  
This approach would also face practical challenges. Benefits with a 
higher dollar value could increase concerns of moral hazard or fraud. Plus, it 
would be difficult to administer and finance benefits based on individual lost 
wages, especially if a substantial number of higher-earners took on caregiving 
roles. Realistically, full wage replacement is infeasible, but partial 
replacement is conceivable. As an example, California is one of three states 
with a disability program designed to compensate family caregiving by 
replacing lost income—the others are Rhode Island and New Jersey. In 2016 
in California, which has the most generous of the three programs, the program 
reimburses caregivers fifty-five percent of lost earnings, but up to a maximum 
of $1129 per week and only for six weeks total.296 Of course, anything less 
                                               
292 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 24, at 27. But see Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of 
Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of the PPACA, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1890-91 
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address, in a deliberate way, the major risks of life, then the focus of present programs on the 
risks of paid employment begins to seem oddly narrow.”). 
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than full wage replacement relatively reduces incentives to take leave from 
work to provide care. 
The other approach would be to compensate the hours a next friend 
spends caring for another at market caregiving wages. Symbolically, this 
approach values hours spent in terms of the service provided instead of in 
terms of opportunity costs.  
This approach would also have strong dynamic effects. It creates greater 
incentives for people with lower or no salary to provide care and for higher 
earners not to do so. Benefits would be a job engine for the unemployed or 
underemployed. At the same time, this approach would perpetuate the existing 
gendered division of care work. Even more, it could actively discourage 
women from pursuing work outside of the home, by making home-based work 
relatively more attractive than it is now. It would reinforce expectations that 
the lower-earning family members (more often women) take on caregiving 
and that the higher earners stay in their more lucrative position. Yet, if 
benefits are fungible and could be used just as easily to outsource care, the 
lower-earning member still gains leverage, as compared to the status quo, to 
resist expectations that she be the one to provide the care.  
On balance, paying for hours based on market wages, or, even better, a 
living wage297 might be preferable. The value of benefits for home-based care 
would be the same regardless of whether someone chooses to provide or pay 
for the care. Someone would have to value providing care more than her status 
quo position (including any wage differential) to take it on personally, or else 
she could pay someone else to do it. Higher earners would still have incentive 
to outsource, rather than provide care, but the two options would be more 
comparable than in today’s world with no compensation for informal 
caregiving in most cases. Even if this approach replicates incentives for 
people without wage jobs or with lower-paid jobs to take on caregiving, they 
would, at the least, receive monetary compensation for work they already do 
now without pay. To avoid this replication would require either a thick 
version of state neutrality that discourages people from informal caregiving 
altogether or policies that address the sources of underlying bias in more 
substantial ways.  
This example illustrates how the notion of creating neutral policies may 
be simple in concept but not in application. The best policymakers can do is to 
design the most evenhanded policy possible and monitor and reconsider the 
effects of policy decisions over time. 
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D.  Considerations for What Counts as Next-Friend Risk 
Even those who, in theory, favor social insurance for next-friend risk 
might disagree on what exactly should qualify as insurable risk. Some 
activities seem routine and others less so. How do we know when an adult 
child caring for a parent is at risk as compared to just doing what children do 
for their parents? Is it risky simply to be responsible for another’s care or only 
when someone lacks the resources to manage such responsibility?  
These types of boundary questions undergird all insurance design, 
private and social. The answers determine which costs will be shared and 
which should remain private obligations.298 For example, the ACA requires 
insurers to charge most insured individuals similar premiums, but allows them 
to charge smokers higher premiums. 299  Expressively, this policy signals a 
belief that smokers have increased their chances of harm and thus should 
remain privately responsible for more costs.300 Often the principle of choice is 
invoked to justify what is in or out: those costs that result from personal 
choices should be private, while stochastic harms should not.301  
Line-drawing decisions are inevitably normative and often highly 
contested.302 These determinations are high stakes, in part because they serve 
to shape how we think about social problems.303 Richard Ericson writes: “In 
making risks collective and commodified, insurance alters notions of 
providence, responsibility and justice.” 304  For example, Medicare freed 
employers from responsibility for retiree health care spending.305 Conversely, 
the lack of cohesive state systems for long-term care insurance tacitly affirms 
private responsibility. The boundaries of any new approach to insure next-
friend risk will likewise shape how people think about responsibility for long-
term care for years to come.  
                                               
298 Tom Baker, Risk, Insurance, and Responsibility, in EMBRACING RISK, supra note 23, at 33, 
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304 Id. at 48.  
305 See STARR, supra note 49, at 388 (1982); see also FRANK MCARDLE ET AL., Retiree Health 
Benefits at the Crossroads, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1 fig.1 (2014), 
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In this Section, I do not attempt to firmly draw these boundaries, 
although I suggest that some lines are easier to defend than others. My main 
aim is to identify the places where the difficult questions arise and what is at 
stake when lines are drawn. 
 
 1.  Who Bears Next-Friend Risk? 
The paradigmatic case of long-term care is that of an adult child caring 
for an aging parent, but only about half of cases fit this picture.306 Consider 
the following scenarios:  
 
A young girl is diagnosed with autism. She will require significant care 
for her entire life. She has two siblings, and both parents work to earn 
enough to support the family. (Lifelong-Care Scenario)  
 
A middle-aged man with a wife and no kids has bone-marrow cancer. 
His medical care, including chemotherapy and a bone-marrow 
transplant, may continue for years. (Midlife-Disruption Scenario) 
 
An elderly widower with two adult children, a daughter and a son, has a 
stroke. He had been living independently yet modestly among a 
community of close friends. Now he needs help with basic activities, like 
showering, voiding, and preparing his food. (Aging Parent Scenario) 
 
It is likely that the parents, the wife, and the daughter (less likely but 
possibly the son or a close family friend) will take on responsibility for 
caregiving in these cases. They are the next friends, responsible in practice, 
even if not required by law, for the long-term care and wellbeing of another. 
Are the burdens each faces similar next-friend risks, or is there something 
fundamentally different about these situations that warrants treating them 
differently? 
Above, I offered one definition of risk as a probabilistic harm. To some, 
the Aging Parent Scenario might seem more an inevitability. It is more 
common that someone would need to care for a parent than for a spouse, 
sibling, child, or friend with serious illness and disability.307 One implication 
might be that adult children should thus expect and plan for parental care. 
Even though more common, about one-half of people never need long-term 
care and, among those who need care, the amount of care needed is highly 
variable, ranging from very little to years of intensive care.308 Thus, even for 
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adult children, it would be difficult to know what level of parental care to 
anticipate.  
Conversely, some might have an intuition against seeing the Lifelong 
Care and Midlife Disruption scenarios as cases of next-friend risk. Perhaps 
people take a gamble when they have a child or get married, and the harms 
that result are not morally arbitrary. Ronald Dworkin called non-arbitrary 
harm the result of “option luck,” as contrasted with “brute luck.” 309  The 
principle that justice demands less for harms that result from option luck has 
been called “choice-sensitivity.” 310  Kenneth Abraham describes that “the 
degree to which a risk is controllable and the degree to which the activity 
producing it is socially optional, would form the basis of an egalitarian 
standard of fair risk distribution in insurance.”311 Put simply, people should 
bear the costs of their own choices. 
Someone’s choices can undeniably increase the likelihood of becoming 
responsible for someone else. Some people explicitly promise to care for life 
partners in sickness, as well as in health. Likewise, most people choose 
whether to have children, knowing that raising children is a risky endeavor in 
ways that both can and cannot be anticipated. At the most basic level, most of 
us know (or should know) that there is some potential for extraordinary levels 
of responsibility for another when entering into a relationship. Perhaps 
parents, spouses, and friends have assumed the risk of such responsibility 
when they enter into relationships, in a way that children, grandchildren, and 
siblings have not.312  
Yet, these distinctions between those relationships we choose and those 
we are born into are shaky. Reasonable people may actually not understand 
the extent of responsibility they could bear for another when they marry or 
have a child. Most people underestimate the chance that someone they love 
will become disabled or ill and need care, especially when it is a distant 
possibility.313 Many people assume that their insurance—public or private—
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(proposing an “equal access advantage” theory, wherein involuntary disadvantages—those 
beyond the actor’s control—merit compensation, while disadvantages incurred voluntarily by 
the actor do not). But see Shiffrin, supra note 301. (challenging the egalitarian emphasis on 
choice sensitivity as a problem for individual freedom). Perceptions of control have been 
important historically for social insurance. Advocates built support for workers’ compensation 
by showing statistically that most workplace injuries were not a worker’s fault. See WITT, supra 
note 24, at 142-43. 
311 ABRAHAM, supra note 265, at 27.  
312 See Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie: A Few Troubling Questions About Where, 
Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1753, 
1758 (2001) (arguing against employment- or state-based parental benefits because they cause 
the childless to subsidize those who have children, which often benefits the male worker). 
313 See Brown & Finkelstein, supra note 33, at 131 (explaining why research suggests that 
limited knowledge or bounded rationality might limit purchase of private long-term care 
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will cover long-term care, when in most cases it does not.314 Additionally, as 
discussed above, the nature of care for a person with a disability is quickly 
becoming more medically intensive over time than most people could 
imagine. Thus, most people marry or have children with no concept of the 
potential responsibility they face if a loved one suffers from chronic illness or 
disability.   
Assume for a moment, however, that people did fully contemplate this 
potential responsibility and still engage voluntarily in relationships. There are 
reasons why even in this case it might not make sense for them to fully 
internalize the costs. The state often helps people whose choices increase their 
risk of harm in order to protect such choices or to promote other important 
values. 315  For example, our courts invalidate indemnification clauses in 
agreements for participation in sports or dangerous activities 316  and 
agreements where patients contract away the right to sue in return for medical 
care, 317  when it seems unjust for individuals to bear the costs of harm. 
Disaster relief efforts bail out people who built their homes in flood plains, on 
earthquake fault lines, or along Tornado Alley because asking them to bear 
the costs individually would be devastating.  
Social insurance often mitigates harms, even when individual agency 
may increase the risk. Medicare covers medical harms for people who are 
sicker because they did not care for their bodies in the first sixty-five years of 
their life. Social Security does not differentiate between those people who 
failed to save and those who succeeded.  
François Ewald describes the paradigm of social solidarity underlying 
social insurance as “not based on fault but on risk.”318 What he means is that it 
is less important to diagnose ex post whether an individual intensified the 
possibility of harm she suffers. The more consequential question is whether 
we want individuals to bear the full cost of obligations simply because they 
derive in part from their own actions. We might in fact not want people to 
bear the full costs of extraordinary obligation for loved ones because it could 
dissuade kinship relationships. By not requiring people to bear the full cost of 
such choices, social insurance protects the activity in which they participate—
in this case getting married or having children. 
Even among choice-sensitive egalitarians, there is disagreement about 
what should be attributed to choice.319 Individual decisions to partner and to 
have children are in most cases voluntary. But in aggregate, they are not. 
                                                                                                                
insurance).  
314 See Brown et al., supra note 35, at 1298. 
315 Shiffrin, supra note 301, at 275-84 (providing examples of “accommodation practices,” 
where we absorb costs of others’ voluntary behavior, including exemptions to the draft and 
exempting some people from working on religious holidays).  
316 E.g., Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734, 742 (Conn. 2005). 
317 E.g., Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 448-49 (Cal. 1963) (en banc). 
318 Ewald, supra note 24, at 277.  
319 Shiffrin, supra note 301, at 272. 
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Imagine a society where no one developed long-lasting relationships, or no 
one had children. It would be a dismal and short-lived society. When 
considered from a collective, rather than individual, perspective, entering into 
kinship relationships can be seen as the kind of non-optional social activity 
that Abraham contends meets the egalitarian standards for risk spreading,320 or 
as deserving because such relationships are something “profoundly good for 
society.”321  
So far, I have discussed cases where someone increases next-friend risk 
simply by engaging in a relationship where she makes it more likely that she 
will take responsibility for another’s unpredictable harm. A more extreme but 
less common example is when someone acts in a way that increases the 
likelihood of someone else becoming ill or disabled. In other words, her 
choices increase the risk that someone for whom she is responsible would 
need long-term care, not just the risk that she will be responsible for it if it 
occurs due to random misfortune. Consider, for example, a pregnant woman 
whose actions increase the likelihood she will have a child with birth defects 
or a couple who proceeds with a pregnancy after a genetic test confirms that 
their baby has Trisomy 18 (Edwards syndrome)—a chromosomal abnormality 
that results in a child, if born alive, living a short life with intensive caregiving 
needs.322  
Sometimes insurance carves out these types of situations under the label 
of “moral hazard,” and affirms that people should have to pay for such harms 
themselves. But even in these more extreme situations such exclusions might 
be unjust. With respect to the first example, public health studies show that 
certain unhealthy behaviors are shaped strongly by factors outside of an 
individual’s control, such as biology, psychology, or social environment.323 
On the second, for some people, continuing a pregnancy to full-term is not a 
choice at all. Requiring these individuals to shoulder the full cost of a child 
born with a disability would, in the first, compound socioeconomic inequities 
and, in the second, force people to choose between their moral beliefs and 
their basic security.324  
There is no simple, principled definition of which relationships generate 
next-friend risk worthy of social insurance protection. Decisions about 
whether such relationships are in or out are informed by moral judgment about 
                                               
320 ABRAHAM, supra note 265, at 27. 
321 Simon, supra note 23, at 135. 
322 See, e.g., What Is Trisomy 18?, TRISOMY 18 FOUND. (2016), http://www.trisomy18.org/what-
is-trisomy-18. 
323  E.g., Neil Pearce & George Davey Smith, Is Social Capital the Key to Inequalities in 
Health?, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 122, 125 (2003) (describing that health is related to social 
factors because of “the influence of social cohesion on health-related behaviors”); see also S.A. 
Reijneveld, The Impact of Individual and Area Characteristics on Urban Socioeconomic 
Differences in Health and Smoking, 27 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 33, 35, 38 (1998) (finding that 
poor health behaviors in impoverished areas are due overwhelmingly to individuals’ low 
socioeconomic status). 
324 See Shiffrin, supra note 301, at 276 (describing how it is common to accommodate religious 
practices). 
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when caregiving should remain a private obligation and when it is worthy of 
collective support.  
2.  Distinguishing Risk from Routine 
A second challenge is to identify what responsibilities signal that 
someone has experienced next-friend risk. This question demands 
reevaluation of what we expect from individuals and what exceeds 
expectations. All relationships come with responsibility. In some cases, 
obligations seem more routine and in others, extraordinary. For example, a 
daughter who grocery shops for her father and checks in on him briefly a few 
times a week might ensure his wellbeing with little effort. Most people would 
see this level of engagement as routine. Yet, if he needs eight hours of care a 
day and that care includes help with feeding and bathing and going to the 
bathroom, it seems less routine. Feeding children, bathing them, and getting 
them to bed are routine parts of the day for many people. Yet, around-the-
clock care for a child with a serious disability or feeding, bathing, and 
transferring a fifty-year-old spouse into a bed are of a different nature. 
What is difficult is where to draw the line between these two extremes. 
Some people have children who are easy to care for, and others have children 
who, for any number of reasons, require a much greater investment of time, 
energy, and, perhaps, angst. Relationships ebb and flow in what they demand 
from people. There is no clear line between routine and extraordinary 
responsibility.  
One starting point would be to define next-friend risk by the triggering 
event. Next-friend risk is realized only when the care recipient has suffered 
from substantial illness or injury or has a disability that requires prolonged, 
intensive care. Benefits could be defined based on the disability, injury, or 
illness that triggered a need for care. This categorical approach is, admittedly, 
imprecise. A mother might engage in the exact same activities for a child 
without a disability as she would for one with a disability and have those 
activities be insurable only in the latter case. It also does not recognize the 
way that chronic disease evolves. 325  This approach trades off nuance for 
administrability and, because of the latter advantage, is often the standard 
used in long-term care insurance benefit determinations in countries that 
insure long-term care.326 
Alternatively, next-friend risk could be defined in a more bottom-up 
way, based on the number of hours a next-friend spends in “qualifying” long-
                                               
325 Montgomery et al., supra note 176, at 23 (“Initially, the care needs of the elder may be 
relatively small and the corresponding care tasks may represent only minimal extensions of the 
familial role relationship . . . . [O]ver time, the caregiving activities transform the initial mother-
daughter relationship into a caregiving relationship.”) 
326 WIENER ET AL., supra note 291, at 9. 
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term care activities, such as helping with Activities of Daily Living. This 
approach is more difficult administratively, but provides a more accurate way 
to capture the real levels of obligation. Policies could set a baseline of care 
that someone would have to provide before being considered at risk—a 
deductible paid in dollars or hours before indemnification begins. A well-
designed deductible would reduce concerns of moral hazard and reveal who 
are devoted next friends, because someone would have to show a level of 
commitment before being able to qualify for benefits.327  
Defining when someone has experienced next-friend risk thus requires 
both determining what type of activity and what extent of activity qualifies, as 
well as what share, if any, should remain private obligation. Definitions that 
include more activities shift more responsibility away from an individual and 
to the collective. Conversely, carving out more activities preserves private 
obligation. Any method for making such decisions involves tradeoffs between 
precision and administrability and some arbitrariness. 
3.  Does Financial Status Quo Matter? 
Should risk of harm be contingent on financial status quo? In other 
words, is the risk of harm merely that a next friend has to use resources, 
measured in time or money, to support another’s long-term care, or does risk 
arise only when she has to use resources that she does not have to spare?  
For example, in the Aging Parent Scenario, if the daughter is wealthy, 
she might pay for professional care without risking her family’s financial 
security.328 The same is true for the parents of the daughter with autism in the 
Lifelong Care Scenario. Perhaps they do not experience next-friend risk if 
they can easily afford to enroll her in a special school and to create a trust 
fund for her care after they die. Using state funds to support care in these 
cases might be unnecessary or undesirable. 
Yet, a means-based definition of risk does not capture the many ways 
that responsibility for another can pose burdens. Even if a next friend is 
wealthy, if she takes on responsibility for another, she will experience costs, 
both financial and nonmonetary. Requiring her to deplete her own savings 
reinforces a system where private obligation is primary and the state’s role is 
secondary. 329  Making eligibility contingent on wealth also devalues the 
nonmonetary costs she faces.  
Attempts to define risk based on a next friend’s wealth may also be 
futile. As noted above, few people have the resources necessary to pay for any 
                                               
327 It might also lead to a consolidation of care because, with multiple caregivers, it is possible 
that no one would exceed the deductible.  
328 The same might be said if she has a lot of free time and provides care directly. Does her 
temporal status quo matter? I previously addressed this question in more detail, see supra 
Section II.C, but just note that the same analysis could apply with respect to time, as respect to 
money, here. 
329 See Zatz, supra note 302, at 580 (reasoning that expecting family or friends to pay for 
another in need can be seen as the “state . . . exploiting their generosity”). 
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prolonged period of long-term care—one reason why most next friends 
provide it in kind. Trying to isolate the few who do have such resources would 
require significant administrative effort with little payoff. Furthermore, if care 
recipients can choose any next friend, they could just designate a poor family 
member. Means tests would dissuade people who are in more stable 
circumstances from taking on the role of next friend if they cannot claim state 
support but a sibling or friend in a more precarious position could. The end 
result might be suboptimal care arrangements.  
Defining risk as contingent on a next friend’s financial resources would 
replicate current inequities in financing for long-term care. Poor next friends, 
who qualify for benefits, could use the benefits to choose to arrange for or to 
provide care. Wealthy next friends would self insure and have the same 
choice. But middle-income next friends would neither qualify for benefits nor 
have money to pay for care, leaving them in the same position many are in 
today: providing care because no other option is available. 
Another approach, in a classic model of social insurance, defines harm 
based on an ex ante, population-based view. Not knowing what any one 
individual’s lot in life will be, social insurance is designed to protect everyone 
from “common economic risks in a changing world.”330 Those who end up 
less in need of such protections because of a good lot in life are not expunged 
from the program ex post. For example, Medicare pays for medical care for 
nearly all Americans over age sixty-five, regardless of wealth level, protecting 
against harm from poor health in retirement. Likewise, Social Security pays 
benefits to all eligible retirees, regardless of private savings.  
A universal approach would, in effect, define next-friend risk simply as 
taking responsibility for the long-term care of another. Avoiding categorical 
inquiry would have all of the benefits that accrue to other universal social 
insurance programs. Social Security and Medicare—the two social insurance 
programs with near universal contribution and benefits—endure as among the 
most popular U.S. government programs.331 As expressed in a recent book on 
social insurance: “Covering most people at risk and treating everyone equally 
as risk bearers increases the sense of social insurance’s fairness.”332 Nearly 
eighty percent of Americans think these programs have benefitted the United 
States and a majority would not reduce current benefit levels to reduce the 
deficit or taxes.333  
Means-testing, in contrast, is solidarity-diminishing because it draws a 
line between the haves, who are self-sufficient, and the have-nots, who are 
                                               
330 MARMOR ET AL., supra note 24, at 217. 
331 Id. at 219 (“[B]ecause everyone is both a contributor and a potential beneficiary, the politics 
of social insurance tends to be of the “us-us” rather than the “us-them” form.”) 
332 Id.  
333 Id. at 222.  
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not.334 Creating universal benefits can avoid such stratification. As one expert 
describes, it enhances the “pedigree of cultural respectability” of a program by 
not requiring “questions about morally freighted matters such as family 
income and assets, household composition, or individual work effort.”335  
Yet, a universal approach can redistribute resources from categories of 
people who are low risk to those who are high risk in a way that will, in some 
cases, be regressive. For example, if people with no siblings are at higher risk 
of caring for a parent and also more likely to be higher income, they might be 
subsidized by people who are on average lower income. Regressivity can be 
lessened by progressive financing. If the higher-income child contributed to 
the program more through higher tax rates throughout her lifetime, she could 
draw benefits without necessarily being subsidized by lower-income others.336 
Social Security and Medicare are both structured in this way. 
A separate question is whether next-friend risk can exist at all when the 
care recipient has financial resources to pay for care.337 When a person with a 
disability or illness can finance his own care, his family member, in theory, 
faces less responsibility. For example, if the father in the Parent Scenario were 
wealthy, he could pay for someone to provide his care. Or he could ask his 
daughter to provide the care and compensate her.338 This issue highlights the 
relational aspect of long-term care risk. Social insurance benefits for the 
daughter of a wealthy man might effectively serve to preserve her inheritance. 
Some might gauge use of collective resources in this way as less just or lower 
priority. Others might see her inheritance as part of what she has to lose from 
next-friend risk.  
These difficult boundary questions are a core part of any social insurance 
design. It is necessary first to quantify a harm someone has experienced and 
then, second, to decide who should pay that price.  
E. Objections to Insuring Next-Friend Risk 
Any expansion of social insurance is highly contested—an 
understatement in light of the fact that, years after its passage, the ACA 
remains under constant attack.339 The standard objections involve questioning 
the proper role of the state, administrability, and affordability. Policies where 
family members can be paid for caregiving trigger heightened moral hazard 
and fraud objections—objections that have the rhetorical power to stop 
                                               
334 GÖSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 63-64 (1990).  
335 MARMOR ET AL., supra note 24, at 219.  
336 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 674-75 (1994).  
337 This question is relevant to care for a parent or friend but would not apply in most cases 
where the care recipient is a child or a spouse.  
338 Of course, such a bargain is complex and often results in broken promises. See HARTOG, 
supra note 29.  
339 See Deirdre Walsh, House Sends Obamacare Repeal Bill to the White House, CNN (Jan. 6, 
2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/06/politics/house-obamacare-repeal-planned-parenthood 
(describing the most recent of more than sixty votes to repeal all or part of the law).  
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policies in their tracks. Each of these concerns, discussed in turn herein, can 
inform better policy design, but none is good reason to choose not to better 
insure next-friend risk. 
An increased state role in long-term care can threaten the strong tradition 
and social norms of family care. The state’s entry into this domestic sphere 
sparks concerns of commodification of family caregiving, which could mean a 
number of different things. 340  Sometimes, commodification objections are 
mere pretext for preserving the current, gendered system of caregiving or are a 
thinly veiled way of suggesting that care work is not something public 
resources should compensate. That is the very view this Article aims to 
challenge. A more complex version of a commodification critique is that 
paying for family care would diminish its value because of the “corrosive 
tendency of markets.” 341  This view is well-intentioned, motivated by the 
desire to protect goodness in the connection between loved ones. Yet it is 
based on a fallacy that caregiving and economic activity exist independently. 
Caregiving has long had an implicit and explicit price, both within and outside 
of the family structure.342 In other words, the worlds of money and love are 
already deeply blurred. 
There are, however, some aspects of what family and friends and, also, 
paid caregivers provide that could never be priced in dollar terms.343  But 
paying for the aspects that can be valued—the heavy lifting of long-term care, 
so to speak—need not diminish or crowd out the intimate aspects of care. In 
fact, empirically it does not. Studies show exactly the opposite: even paid 
caregivers show great affection for the people for whom they care. 344  
Furthermore, even when families hire paid caregivers, family members 
continue to spend significant time caring but focus instead on the tasks that 
they are better suited than a formal caregiver at doing.345  
                                               
340 See Deborah Stone, For Love Nor Money: The Commodification of Care, in RETHINKING 
COMMODIFICATION 271 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005). 
341 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 9 (2012); 
see also Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71, 80 
(1990) (considering the special case of surrogacy and the risk of reducing women from 
“persons worthy of respect” to “objects of mere use”); Viviana A. Zelizer, Human Values and 
the Market: The Case of Life Insurance and Death in 19th Century America, 84 AM. J. SOC. 591 
(examining concerns of commodification of death with the introduction of life insurance and 
the gradual diminishing of such concerns).  
342 See HARTOG, supra note 29;. Alstott, supra note 141; Joan C. Williams & Viviana A. 
Zelizer, To Commodify or Not To Commodify: That is Not the Question, in RETHINKING 
COMMODIFICATION, supra note 340, 362, 364-65. 
343 See Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1885 (1987). 
344 See Stone, supra note 340, at 275-77 (discussing studies).  
345 STONE, supra note 168, at 20-21. But see Susan L. Ettner, The Effect of the Medicaid Home 
Care Benefit on Long-term Care Choices of the Elderly, 32 ECON. INQUIRY 103, 123 (1994) 
(showing substitution effects of a greater degree than in other studies); Norma B. Coe et al., 
Family Spillovers of Long-Term Care Insurance 18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 21483, 2015), http://www.terry.uga.edu/media/events/documents/Norma_Coe.pdf 
(showing that private long-term care insurance lowers informal caregiving and the likelihood of 
a child living with a parent). 
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A related critique is that state involvement requires an invasion of 
private, family space. It is true that the availability of benefits requires the 
state to determine eligibility, and the receipt of money necessarily invites 
monitoring. A universal social insurance program with categorical benefits 
would minimize the invasiveness of both efforts. Some research suggests that 
even informal caregivers who face significant burden are skeptical of state 
involvement, but this study also shows that the availability of social insurance 
relief can shift both their roles and their perspectives.346 In other words, the 
privacy concerns seem less acute when a family caregiver experiences the 
benefits of state support.  
Another objection to any expansion of social insurance is that it will 
crowd out private insurance solutions or private savings, which studies 
confirm does occur to some degree.347 The obvious response in the case of 
next-friend risk is that even without public insurance, private insurance 
solutions have failed. The level of private savings that a next friend would 
need to have to effectively self-insure is impossible for nearly everyone, even 
if they saved aggressively. Furthermore, this concern presumes that private 
insurance or saving is the best first option and that state responsibility should 
only be a last resort—the very assumption this Article challenges. 
That all said, private insurance options could be developed over time and 
integrated with public solutions to the degree desired. In fact, if private 
insurance policies were marketed to next friends to mitigate the risk they face, 
it might prove more saleable.  Some of the bias that thwarts people from 
buying long-term care policies for themselves might not deter children from 
insuring against the risk of caring for their parents or future parents from 
insuring against the risk of a child with a disability. And, according to one 
study, if private policies included benefits to pay family members for care, 
there would be greater purchase of them by people who now opt out because 
they prefer family care over formal care.348 Social insurance policies could 
continue to include incentives for the purchase of private long-term care 
policies, as in the long-term care partnerships.349  
Moral hazard and fraud are simultaneously sources of genuine concern 
and red herrings. As Jonathan Simon has written, “The perception that fraud is 
rampant in welfare and social insurance systems has helped to de-legitimize 
broad, entitlement-based risk spreading programs. Indeed . . . moral hazard 
                                               
346 Levitsky, supra note 169, at 564. 
347  See David M. Cutler & Jonathan Gruber, Does Public Insurance Crowd Out Private 
Insurance?, 111 Q.J. ECON. 391, 391 n.1 (1996).  
348 See Mommaerts, supra note 39. 
349  See, e.g., Jamie P. Hopkins et al., Leveraging Filial Support Laws Under the State 
Partnership Programs To Encourage Long-Term Care Insurance, 20 WIDENER L. REV. 165, 
195 (2014) (arguing for increased enforcement of filial support laws as a “stick” to incentivize 
private insurance purchase by increasing personal liability); Haizhen Lin & Jeffrey T. Prince, 
Determinants of Private Long-Term Care Insurance Purchase in Response to the Partnership 
Program, 51 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 687, 699-700 (2016) (finding that efforts at program 
awareness and financial literacy may increase program success). For discussion of these 
programs and their shortcomings, see supra note 44 and accompanying text.   
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has become a block on any substantial expansion of social insurance in recent 
decades.”350 Moral hazard is the idea that when people are insured, they have 
reduced incentive to avoid losses. Moral hazard can be an ex ante failure to 
prevent losses (i.e., carelessness when insured) or an ex post failure to 
mitigate losses as inexpensively as possible (i.e., malingering).351  Ex ante 
moral hazard—the idea that people will fail to prevent harm—is inapt in this 
context. The risk of harm is only triggered by the disability or illness of a 
loved one, circumstances that people avoid for independent reasons, even if 
insured. The more pertinent concern is that social insurance will lead to 
overuse of benefits. In other words, the number of people living with and 
caring for someone else will skyrocket in response to the availability of 
insurance benefits.  
This so-called woodwork effect might capture two different things. It 
might simply mean that more people are getting the necessary care that they 
were not before. Meeting unmet demand in this way is what Deborah Stone 
has called a “moral opportunity” and is the very purpose of social welfare 
programs.352 It could also mean that people are exaggerating a need for care, if 
someone could get by on her own but will take help if a family member can 
get cash benefits to provide the assistance. This possibility is harder to avoid, 
but can be lessened through well-designed criteria for eligibility based on a 
disability determination. Other countries with social insurance for long-term 
care have developed systems where case workers or medical professionals 
measure and categorize levels of disability, which have worked reasonably 
well.353 
Avoiding moral hazard informs the design of any social insurance 
program. As Anne Alstott has written, “Moral hazard permeates every form of 
insurance, and . . . there are a host of tools for managing it, including 
copayments, categorical eligibility, delayed benefits, limited benefits, self-
financing, and so on.”354 With respect to long-term care, a deductible could 
reduce moral hazard. As suggested above, policies could set a number of 
hours of care that someone would have to provide or arrange and pay for 
before she would qualify for benefits. Even if it is a real concern, empirical 
evidence of long-term care social insurance that pays family members cash 
benefits suggests that such concerns may be overstated.355  
                                               
350 Simon, supra note 23, at 131. 
351 See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 270 (1996). 
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Fraud may be a more challenging problem. People might misrepresent 
disability if they can get cash benefits for family. Or next friends might claim 
benefits and not provide care. Fraud enforcement with personal care services 
is particularly difficult because the services are diffuse in individual homes 
and hard to monitor. The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of 
Health and Human Services has already made a special effort to detect fraud 
in home-based personal care services under Medicaid.356 Medical eligibility 
determinations can be used to root out false claims. And high penalties for 
fraudulent claims can be used as a deterrent. Even though there would 
undoubtedly be some problems with fraud, evaluation of demonstration 
projects, where benefits can be used to pay family for care, have also found 
surprisingly few cases of fraudulent use of the benefits.357  
 Concerns about quality of care when provided by family or friends is a 
particularly American preoccupation. Other countries with long-term care 
policies that offer cash benefits for family to provide care believe that, in 
general, people are likely to get better care from family than from formal 
caregivers.358 Results from the Cash and Counseling Demonstration project in 
the United States revealed fewer cases of abuse and neglect and fewer unmet 
needs among beneficiaries who used a cash benefit compared to control group 
members.359 There would of course be some problems with poor quality care 
at the hands of friends or family, but it may prove no worse—and possibly 
better—than in formal care settings. Further, these next friends are many of 
the same people providing unpaid care today. Compensating them for their 
work would be unlikely to reduce the quality of their caregiving. 
Finally, any comprehensive solution would be very expensive—a fact 
which undoubtedly influences many scholars’ pragmatic focus on piecemeal 
solutions. Total paid long-term care was just over $220 billion in 2011, 
excluding Medicare post-acute care. 360  The aforementioned estimate of 
replacement cost of family caregiving is $470 billion, which would triple 
current spending, and is only a partial account of long-term care since it only 
considers care for adults.361 This increased cost is a genuine hurdle. 
Current policy, however, has simply obscured the fact that individuals 
shoulder those costs privately, as an invisible copayment, and has enabled 
political inaction. The United States spends relatively less on long-term care 
than other developed countries do, even as it spends more on nearly every 
other category of health care. 362  Accounting for next-friend risk makes it 
                                               
356 Office of Inspector General, Spotlight on . . . Medicaid Personal Care Services, U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (June 7, 2011), 
https://oig.hhs.gov/newsroom/spotlight/2012/portfolio01.asp. 
357  See ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., CASH & COUNSELING PROGRAM RESULTS (2013), 
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/program_results_reports/2015/rwjf406468. 
358 See WIENER ET AL., supra note 291, at 19-20. 
359 Barbara Lepidus Carlson et al., Effects of Cash and Counseling on Personal Care and Well-
Being, 42 HEALTH SERVS RES. 467, 476-79 (2007). 
360 O’Shaughnessy, supra note 9, at 3. 
361 Reinhard et al., supra note 26, at 3.  
362 MCKINSEY CTR. FOR U.S. HEALTH SYS. REFORM, supra note 262, at 9. 
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harder to continue down this path. If the Congressional Budget Office were to 
include the over half-trillion dollars in care provided by informal caregivers as 
a cost of current policies, it would hamstring these policies that are biased 
toward informal caregiving.363 Legal myopia has saved the government an 
estimated half-trillion dollars a year in direct costs. These costs are not 
avoided. They are simply borne off budget and disproportionately by people 
less able to bear them.  
 
*** 
 
 In sum, the real costs of our current system and the insecurity and 
inequities it generates demand recognizing next-friend risk and considering it 
on par with care-recipient risk. In part, social policies have prioritized care-
recipient risk because of the immediacy of the need, the vulnerability of the 
recipients, and the dire consequences of failing to meet their needs. But next-
friend risk is creating deep and long-lasting harm. This harm is easier to 
ignore but no less important of a target for social policy. Although we should 
not neglect the short-term needs of the disabled and sick, we should no more 
neglect the wellbeing and security of their next friends. 
 Any major social problem seems too big to solve until society 
recognizes that the costs of not solving it are also untenable. Many other 
countries—including Japan, Germany, and the Netherlands, as discussed 
below—have overcome objections and created universal long-term care social 
insurance systems. These systems are expensive, and these countries certainly 
revisit the costs on a regular basis. Yet, they each (and others as well) have 
decided that long-term care is an important social priority and worth an 
investment of social resources. 
IV.   A BRIEF SKETCH OF POLICY OPTIONS 
The primary goal of this Article is to introduce the concept of next-friend 
risk and to make the case for considering it as a social policy priority. I leave 
for later the development of policy details. Nonetheless, this Part offers a brief 
sketch of several different possible approaches to illustrate how policies—
both comprehensive and incremental—can be designed in ways more 
sensitive to next-friend risk.  
One primary goal would be to create financing and institutional 
structures for long-term care that enable a smoother toggle between paying for 
care and providing care, as described above. Policies must have a toggle in 
                                               
363 Although the Congressional Budget Office generally does not consider opportunity costs, it 
does consider the macroeconomic second-order or “dynamic” effects of policies in its 
budgetary analysis. See Keith Hall, Answers to Questions About Dynamic Analysis, CONG. 
BUDGET OFF. (July 1, 2015), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/50357.     
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structure and support processes and institutions that empower next friends to 
actually choose between options. Section IV.A illustrates how a 
comprehensive social insurance program could better mitigate next-friend 
risk. Yet, incremental changes that build on existing social welfare programs 
could also make a significant difference, as discussed in Section IV.B.  
A.  Envisioning Next-Friend Social Insurance 
1.  The Basic Concept  
A universal long-term care social insurance program could be designed 
with the explicit goal of mitigating both next-friend and care-recipient risk. 
The specific contours could take many forms. The basic idea would be that 
someone who has a qualifying disability would designate a next-friend, who 
would then receive benefits that could be used to pay for or provide care. It 
could be designed to supplement what Medicaid does now for care recipients 
or to replace it entirely. It could be created from the ground up or expand the 
scope and size of existing programs that are sensitive to next-friend risk, such 
as the Veterans Administration family caregiving program or Cash and 
Counseling participant-directed programs, discussed below. Others have 
offered proposals for universal long-term care insurance.364 Here, I consider 
specifically what elements such social insurance would need to include to be 
sensitive to next-friend risk and how it might differ from policies that focus 
narrowly on care-recipient risk.  
Eligibility would be based on both the care recipient and next friend. The 
first step would be determination of qualifying disability or illness, based on a 
care recipient’s condition, as with Medicaid and Medicare post-acute care 
now. A second step would be to identify an eligible next friend, which could 
be based on whom a care-recipient or her legal guardian chooses. Eligibility 
rules could categorically limit next friends to close relatives, as the Family 
and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) does for its guarantee of twelve 
                                               
364 Recent proposals for universal long-term care insurance include, for example, JUDY FEDER 
ET AL., GEORGETOWN UNIV. LONG-TERM CARE FINANCING PROJECT, LONG-TERM CARE 
FINANCING: POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE (2007), 
https://georgetown.box.com/shared/static/mhdbkd4vtklps9ntkskc.pdf; INST. OF MED. & NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, FINANCING LONG-TERM SERVICES AND 
SUPPORTS FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES AND OLDER ADULTS: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 
(2013), http://www.nap.edu/read/18538/chapter/1; UNIVERSAL COVERAGE OF LONG-TERM CARE 
IN THE UNITED STATES: CAN WE GET THERE FROM HERE? (Douglas Wolf & Nancy Folbre, eds., 
2012); Laphonza Butler et al., Long-Term Care Comm’n, A Comprehensive Approach to Long-
Term Services and Supports (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/LTCCAlternativeReport.pdf (dissenting report from Commission on 
Long-Term Care’s September 30, 2013 Report to the Congress); Melissa M. Favreault et al., 
Financing Long-Term Services and Supports: Options Reflects Trade-Offs for Older Americans 
and Federal Spending, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1 (2015); Lee Goldberg & G. Lawrence Atkins, Social 
Insurance: A Critical Base for Financing Long-Term Services and Supports,  SCAN FOUND. 
(2013), 
http://www.thescanfoundation.org/sites/default/files/ltc_financing.social.insurance.goldberg.3.2
0.13.pdf; and Anne Tumlinson et al., Insuring Americans for Long-Term Care: Challenges and 
Limitations of Voluntary Insurance,  AVALERE HEALTH (2013), 
http://avalere.com/research/docs/20130320_Avalere_RTI_Scan_LTI.pdf.  
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weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave for family care.365 But a more flexible 
definition would better reflect the existing picture of informal care, as an 
African saying recognizes: “The one you are left with is your relation.”366 
Program rules might limit the caregiving any one individual can be paid to do 
or the number of people for whom she could be paid to coordinate in-kind 
benefits.  
The process of having to designate a next friend offers the collateral 
benefit of prompting more transparent and deliberate decisions about long-
term care. Naming a next friend would make clear who is responsible for 
helping a care recipient with care management decisions, akin to naming a 
health care proxy. If benefits were vested in or controlled in part by the next 
friend, it could encourage a care recipient to initiate explicit conversations 
about what kind of care he wants with his next friend, before the next friend 
helps him to operationalize his care.  
Any individual who does not want to provide care would have greater 
ability to opt out. The universality of benefits, and the ability to use them 
interchangeably to pay for in-kind care, would bolster her bargaining 
power.367 Imagine that a mother asks her daughter to care for her in her old 
age. Without next-friend insurance, she may feel as if she has few options. 
With it, in contrast, she could accept responsibility and provide care and get 
paid to do so. She could accept responsibility and hire someone else to 
provide some or all of the care, using benefits for this in-kind assistance. Or 
she could decline and suggest another family member or friend instead. Such 
conversations would undoubtedly still be shaped by family dynamics. But the 
goal would be for the structure of benefits to create a more neutral baseline for 
conversation and for real deliberation. As in other countries’ social insurance 
programs for long-term care, case managers could explain options, mediate 
disputes that arise, and monitor quality on an ongoing basis.368  
A critique of an approach that empowers next friends in the decision 
process is that it erodes the autonomy that independent living movement 
advocates have long worked to wrest back for care recipients, by requiring 
them to name a next friend who has some control over how benefits are 
used.369 Care recipients, however, would retain the ultimate control through 
the ability to designate the next friend.370  
                                               
365 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2012) (reserving job-protected leave for parents, children, and 
spouses).   
366 WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 277, at 11; see also Nancy Knauer, LGBT Older Adults: 
Chosen Family and Caregiving, 31 J.L. & RELIGION (forthcoming 2016), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2721451 (exploring the disproportionate 
reliance on non-relatives for long-term care within the aging LGBT community).   
367  Cf. RHONA MAHONY, KIDDING OURSELVES: BREADWINNING, BABIES AND BARGAINING 
POWER (1996) (discussing how women can use bargaining theory to undo sexual division of 
labor in the home, in part based on having an income-generating position). 
368 See WIENER ET AL., supra note 291, at 8. 
369 See Batavia et al., supra note 48. 
370 There could be an option that allows someone who wants to and is able to do so to manage 
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More importantly, the reality is that many people rely on family to help 
meet their long-term care needs now, and recognizing these caregiving dyads 
more formally in the law would be beneficial. For example, it could address 
problems in the Medicaid consumer-directed demonstration programs, in 
which care recipients can hire and fire their own provider. One criticism of 
these programs is that they turn care recipients into employers and put them in 
a position where they might mismanage their personal budgets. 371  The 
responsibility can be burdensome: “only a fraction of individuals with 
disabilities have the time, inclination, and skills to search for, hire, and train 
their own personal assistants. . . . Many people, disabled and nondisabled . . . 
find that the burdens of becoming an employer are great.” 372  Plus, these 
programs have eroded caregivers’ job benefits and labor protections because 
they treat each care recipient as an individual employer.373 Taking the care 
recipient out of the middle so that the state directly pays the next friend or 
formal caregiver, once selected, avoids these problems. It may be that care 
recipients find that the ability to influence their care, without having to 
manage it or to become an employer, is even more autonomy enhancing. 
Next-friend insurance could professionalize long-term care services, by 
more formally recognizing the work friends and family do and creating a 
structure for formal labor protections and job benefits. The Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA) family caregiver program offers a model. It 
compensates family caregivers at higher rates than other programs and also 
addresses sources of nonmonetary harm.374  Family caregivers of seriously 
injured post-9/11 veterans can receive health insurance, mental health 
services, comprehensive training by Easter Seals, respite care of thirty days or 
more a year, and reimbursement for travel expenses when accompanying the 
veteran for care.375 These types of protections would benefit all informal and 
formal caregivers. 
The point here is not to flesh out the full details of a new social insurance 
benefit but rather to highlight the most critical elements. Next friends would 
be formally appointed and have a voice in decisions. They would be treated as 
workers, if they provide care, or compensated for their time as case managers 
if they help to arrange care. The goals of such policies would be two-fold: to 
get people needed long-term care, and to enable their friends and family to 
help them do so without taking on excessive risk themselves.  
                                                                                                                
his own care by designating a formal care provider to serve as the next friend. Letting someone 
choose to bypass friends and family altogether would still serve the ends of protecting friends 
and family from next-friend risk, while also meeting a care-recipient’s needs and honoring his 
autonomy. 
371 See Crowley, supra note 95, at 16. 
372 Bagenstos, supra note 73, at 79.  
373 See Smith, Home Sweet Home, supra note 126.  
374 Czapanskiy, supra note 123, at 58. 
375 Services for Family Caregivers of Post-9/11 Veterans, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF. (Aug. 10, 
2012), http://www.caregiver.va.gov/support/support_benefits.asp.  
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2.  Models for Next-Friend Social Insurance 
The idea of creating a social insurance program explicitly intending to 
benefit next friends might seem utopian, but there are already elements of this 
type of approach in practice in various small-scale programs, including the 
VA program, the consumer-directed Medicaid programs, and in the state paid 
leave programs in California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, which offer 
benefits to pay for time spent caregiving for family or friends.376 Next-friend 
social insurance could build on these types of efforts. 
It could also be based on the models of universal long-term care social 
insurance implemented in other countries. At the very least, the different 
models chosen elsewhere provide a window into policy design that is more or 
less sensitive to next-friend risk.  
Lessons from long-term care social insurance in Japan, the Netherlands, 
and Germany illustrate how long-term care policy can be designed in ways 
more or less sensitive to next-friend risk. The long-term care policies in these 
three countries share many characteristics: they are all non-means tested, 
universal social insurance programs funded primarily by payroll taxes (and 
secondarily by premiums in Japan and copayments in Germany).377 The Dutch 
and German programs are for beneficiaries of all ages,378 while the Japanese 
program is for older beneficiaries.379 They all give beneficiaries some level of 
control over benefits. Yet, each has had very different results.  
The Japanese program strongly discourages family care with the goal of 
displacing the tradition of reliance on daughters-in-law for elder care.380 The 
program was developed to address social changes similar to those in the 
United States that made this reliance unsustainable: fewer people are living 
with their children; an increased number of women are working; and people 
are more willing to accept outside help.381 This program only pays for in-kind 
care; cash allowances were fought by feminists who wanted dollars to be used 
to grow labor supply to meet demand and to liberate daughters-in-law.382 They 
believed that an option for cash benefits would reinforce oppressive 
caregiving patterns. Japan’s policy design could serve as a model of a strong 
                                               
376 These paid leave programs (soon to be joined by New York), part of the states’ temporary 
disability insurance, replace a portion of salary for four to six weeks when someone takes leave 
from a job to care for a family member, in effect compensating someone’s FMLA leave. See 
Paid Family Leave, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS., (2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-
employment/paid-family-leave-resources.aspx.  
377 See John Creighton Campbell & Naoki Ikegami, Japan’s Radical Reform of Long-Term 
Care, 37 SOC. POL’Y & ADMIN. 21 (2003) (discussing the Japanese reform); Pamela Nadash et 
al., European Long-Term Care Programs: Lessons for Community Living Assistance Services 
and Supports?, 47 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 309 (2012) (discussing the German and Dutch 
programs).  
378 WIENER ET AL., supra note 291, at 3. 
379 Campbell & Ikegami, supra note 377, at 22. 
380 Id. at 22. 
381 Id.  
382 Id. at 26-27. 
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counterbalance to existing family care biases—a thick version of neutral 
policy. In effect, the choice is between paid in-kind care and unpaid informal 
care, putting a heavy thumb on the scale for formal care but still allowing 
someone who strongly values providing care (or with an insistent family 
member) to do so without pay. 
The Dutch and German systems are more similar in design, although 
different in result. The Dutch program illustrates a relatively flexible toggle 
that has resulted in ninety percent of beneficiaries choosing in-kind home-
care. 383  People can choose between in-kind services or a cash “personal 
budget” worth seventy-five percent of the value of the in-kind benefit (the 
discount is explained as due to the higher administrative costs of agency-
based care but creates a bias toward in-kind care).384 For people who choose 
cash, at least ninety percent of the personal budget must be spent on human 
assistance, paying anyone the “budget holder” chooses, including friends or 
family.385 The cash benefits are relatively more valuable than in Germany, yet 
most Dutch claimants still choose in-kind care.386  
Germany’s program, in contrast to both the Japanese and Dutch systems, 
has reinforced reliance on informal caregivers. In 1994, Germany created a 
compulsory, universal social insurance that is available to people with more 
severe disabilities (defined as in need of assistance with at least two Activities 
of Daily Living).387 Like the Dutch system, it has a toggle between in-kind 
services and cash benefits, but the cash benefits have a face value of only 50% 
of the in-kind benefit.388 Despite this significant discount, 80 percent of home 
care beneficiaries and half of all beneficiaries, including those in nursing 
homes, have chosen the cash benefit and continue to rely on informal 
caregivers. 389  
Some of the variability in results may be due to different underlying 
social expectations or institutions but likely not all. All three countries have 
long histories of reliance on family for long-term care. The rates of 
employment of women in the Netherlands is especially low, which, in theory, 
would make the opportunity costs of providing informal care lower than in 
Germany; yet more people choose in-kind care.390 
Several elements of the design of the German program have been 
identified as perpetuating reliance on informal caregivers. The most important 
is that the cash benefit can be used in any way desired and is vested in the care 
recipient, not the caregiver; in other words, the care recipient is given cash 
that the government does not require be spent on human assistance, as in the 
Dutch program. Experts speculate that high unemployment led some 
                                               
383 Nadash et al., supra note 377, at 317-18. 
384 Id. at 314 (discussing how benefits are targeted); WIENER ET AL., supra note 291, at vi. 
385 Nadash et al., supra note 377, at 320. 
386 Id. at 318.  Both countries face shortages of formal caregivers. Id. 
387 Wiener & Cuellar, supra note 355, at 421; Nadash et al., supra note 377, at 311-12. 
388 Nadash et al., supra note 377, at 314. 
389 Id. at 318. 
390 Id. 
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beneficiaries to opt for cash benefits but then to continue to rely on unpaid 
informal care.391  
In addition, the cash benefits, when paid to a family member, are not 
counted as income for tax purposes. 392  And although like in the Dutch 
program, the German family workers are not formally on the state payroll and 
have no formal worker protections, the German government does pay into 
pension, health insurance, and unemployment funds for any family caregiver 
who provides more than fourteen hours of care per week.393 These benefits 
plus tax-free income might make caregiving relatively more attractive than 
other paid work.  
Experts surmise the German program was intentionally designed to bias 
family care, which had been declining as families became smaller and 
geographically dispersed.394  Consistent with conservative German “family-
first” notions, one expert describes that these policies “enabl[ed] women to 
withdraw from the workforce.” 395  The program has thus institutionalized 
reliance on family care, reinforced gender roles, and not contributed to the 
growth of the formal labor force for caregiving. Although the German 
program has a policy toggle in structure, it does not operate fluidly in practice 
and is likely not intended to do so. 
B.  Incremental Reforms 
A new social insurance program is not necessary, however, to better 
mitigate next-friend risk. Especially in the short term, it is possible to build on 
current policies and demonstration projects to scale them and to make them 
more sensitive to next-friend risk. Some approaches would require additional 
funding; others might not.  
1.  Filling in Medicaid’s Gaps 
One possibility is to fill in Medicaid’s gaps so that at least those care 
recipients who are eligible for Medicaid might rely less on next friends. One 
monumental, but potentially expensive, step would be to loosen financial 
eligibility criteria for long-term care benefits.396 Doing so would increase the 
number of Medicaid eligible care recipients and enhance the impact of 
reforms that build on Medicaid as a foundation.397 
                                               
391 Id. at 318 (describing that 31% of all beneficiaries and 49% at the highest level of disability 
report using their benefits for their own expenses). 
392 Id. 
393 Id. 
394 WIENER ET AL., supra note 291, at 15. 
395 Wiener & Cuellar, supra note 355, at 439. 
396 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
397 These types of incremental expansions of eligibility used to be routine, but following the 
Supreme Court’s decision with regard to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion in NFIB v. Sebelius 
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Another incremental step would be to require states to cover more 
personal care services—such as assistance with bathing, feeding, transferring, 
or toileting—for the existing beneficiaries who receive long-term care at 
home, instead of in an institutional setting. As described in Part II, many states 
do not have personal care services programs for adults at all,398 or pay for a 
very limited quantity.399 Changing these benefits from optional to mandatory 
in the standard state programs and requiring waiver programs to cover them at 
sufficient levels would prevent states from shifting long-term care into home 
settings but then failing to cover needed care. The lack of funding for these 
services in home settings not only burdens next friends, it also limits choices. 
When family and friends can fill in the gaps, home care remains a viable 
option. For others, nursing home care might be the only choice. Thus, even 
just increasing funding for these services could meaningfully alleviate burdens 
and stress for next friends, while also preserving options for care recipients 
(even if it left largely unaltered the current structure of long-term care). 
2.  Expanding and Designing Policy Toggles in Medicaid Consumer-
Directed Care Programs 
A more ambitious approach is to adapt, invest in, and build out nascent 
programs that allow benefits to be used more flexibly. A major trend in long-
term care financing is consumer-directed programs that allow beneficiaries the 
ability to hire, train, supervise, and fire their home-care workers. Many of 
these programs are designed with a toggle, where the beneficiary can choose 
either in-kind benefits (formal caregivers or a nursing home) or use a cash 
benefit to pay a family member or friend for care.  
These “participant directed” programs have gained popularity following 
a successful demonstration called Cash and Counseling, initiated in the mid-
1990s by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.400 Six percent of Medicaid 
long-term care beneficiaries are now in a participant-directed program.401 The 
terms of these programs vary considerably state-by-state on important 
dimensions. For example, the majority of the programs restrict hiring a legally 
responsible individual (e.g., a spouse, parent, or legal guardian), which can 
create a bias toward hiring a formal caregiver.402 These programs will likely 
continue to grow as a share of Medicaid long-term care funding and can be 
designed to be more sensitive to next-friend risk if doing so were a core goal. 
                                                                                                                
they would likely be challenged as beyond Congress’ authority. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. 
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012). 
398 Medicaid Benefits: Personal Care Services, supra note 115. 
399 NG. ET AL., supra note 94, at 12-14. 
400 See ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., supra note 357.  
401 Facts and Figures: 2013 National Inventory Survey on Participant Direction, NAT’L RES. 
CTR. FOR PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED SERVS 5 fig.2 (2014), 
https://nrcpds.bc.edu/downloadfile.php?filename=1411162479_NRCPDS_Facts_Figures_Final.
pdf. Six percent includes over thirty percent of beneficiaries in California, which skews the 
national average. Id.  
402 Id. at 11 (reporting that 11% of responding programs indicated that a spouse, parent, or legal 
guardian could be paid as a caregiver).  
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An example of how even just one design element could create bias in 
how benefits are used is illustrated by the In-Home Supportive Services 
(IHSS) program in California. This Medicaid program is the largest program 
in the United States with a toggle that, in design, allows benefits to pay formal 
caregivers or close family members. 403 Two-thirds of IHSS recipients receive 
care from a relative, and in about half of these cases, they live in the same 
home. 404  To qualify for IHSS funding, as well as Supplemental Security 
Income cash benefits for the person with a disability, household income must 
be extremely low. 405  In calculating household income, these programs 
disregard IHSS benefits paid to a family caregiver.406 This means the money 
paid to a wife to care for her husband would not disqualify him from receiving 
benefits, but wages from her work in a job outside the home likely would. The 
policy creates a strong incentive for her to provide care directly, rather than 
keep her job and hire someone to provide the care, even if doing so leaves her 
insecure in the long run. Treating her IHSS income or outside income the 
same—either counting both or neither—is necessary to enable the toggle to 
work. 
As participant-directed care grows in the United States, an approach 
sensitive to next-friend risk would consider how policies should be designed 
to avoid reinforcing a strong bias toward family care, as in Germany or 
California. The goal should be, at the very least, policies that aim for a thin 
version of neutrality. 
3.  Investments in Infrastructure 
Investment in community-based care infrastructure and a formal labor 
force could enhance options in the gap between nursing home and home-
based care. New models show that high-quality care can be provided in 
community settings, but these existing models exist as isolated experiments 
and mostly focus on elder care.407  
One of the first programs, which combines health and personal care 
needs is called On Lok and was started as a health plan in San Francisco in 
                                               
403  ROBERT MOLLICA & LESLIE HENDRICKSON, HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED LONG-TERM 
CARE: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE ACCESS FOR CALIFORNIANS 17 (2009), 
http://www.canhr.org/reports/HomeCommunityBasedCare2009.pdf. 
404  Considering the State Costs and Benefits: In-Home Supportive Services Program, CAL. 
LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (2009), http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2010/ssrv/ihss/ihss_012110.aspx.  
405  IHSS Eligibility Information, CAL. DEP’T SOC. SERVS. (2013), 
http://www.cdss.ca.gov/cdssweb/PG135.htm. 
406 20 C.F.R. § 416.1161(a)(16) (2016). Under this rule, “in-kind support and maintenance” is 
also not deemed income. Id. 
407 Some models of innovative care for children with disabilities exist as well, but are less 
common. For example, the Center for Discovery is a residential center for children, which 
offers “advanced care and treatment” of young people with “medical complexities” and autism 
spectrum disorders. See What We Do, CTR. FOR DISCOVERY (2013), 
http://www.thecenterfordiscovery.org/what-we-do.  
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1971 to help an aging Asian population age at home.408 On Lok inspired a 
Medicare demonstration program known as the Program for All-Inclusive 
Care for the Elderly (PACE). 409 The most intriguing part of the model is the 
On Lok Lifeways Centers, which they call the “hub” of the program, where 
participants go from one to five days a week for medical care, adult day care, 
and social activities, including exercise and meals.410 The model has targeted 
low-income and frail elderly.411 Participants who are eligible for Medicare, 
Medicaid, and SSI pay nothing out of pocket; others pay a monthly fee.412 For 
example, people eligible only for Medicare can “top off” Medicare benefits, 
which enables middle-income families to afford these programs and increases 
funds available for investment in the programs’ growth. On Lok program 
evaluations show high participant satisfaction, improved health and physical 
functioning, improved quality of life, and lower mortality.413 At the same 
time, they free up informal caregivers for all or part of the work week.   
A newer private-sector experiment is the Green House movement. 
Started by a doctor who wanted a better way to care for frail elderly than in 
nursing homes and with seed funding by the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation, Green House intends to be a “homelike” community-based care 
setting. 414  People live in a private room with a bathroom in a small, 
technology-equipped home for eight to ten residents.  They eat communally. 
Green House accepts both Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement. As of the 
end of 2014, 167 Green Houses had over 1700 people living in them, and 108 
new homes were in development. 415  They have had particular success 
recruiting and retaining caregivers, whom they call “shahbazim” and pay ten 
percent more than certified nursing assistants. Green House can afford higher 
salaries because of extremely low turnover and the shahbazims’ responsibility 
for a broad range of activities, from personal care to cooking to 
housekeeping.416  
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Early research on Green House also indicates positive outcomes. 417 
Anecdotal evidence in a recent New York Times article describes one older 
woman who “needed help eating and rarely spoke” but within a day of 
moving into a Green House, fed herself and sang Amazing Grace.418 Even if 
not all residents are so dramatically altered, this program creates smaller-
scale, community-based care options for families who are reticent to “put 
mom in a nursing home.”  
An obvious challenge is scaling such models in a way that they retain 
their quality and remain affordable for more than just the wealthiest families. 
One intriguing aspect of Green Houses is that community members have 
donated land and professional services to build facilities, lowering fixed 
costs.419 For lower-income residents, On Lok received Department of Housing 
and Urban Development funds for its residential facilities. The ability to 
combine public and private funds in both programs creates growth opportunity 
and access for more people. Yet, even with many of these elements in place, 
programs have not scaled well.420 If we understand these kinds of programs as 
necessary to mitigating next-friend risk, learning how to scale them should be 
higher priority.  
One of the greatest infrastructure challenges is the caregiver labor 
shortage. By one estimate, 3.5 million additional health providers, including 
nearly 1.6 million registered nurses and nursing aides, will be needed by 2030 
just to maintain already insufficient provider-to-population ratios.421 Meeting 
the needs of the elderly will be especially hard because of a gap in geriatric 
care training.422  
Higher wages are needed to spur labor growth.423 That said, higher wages 
on their own might be insufficient. As one scholar bluntly recognizes: 
“Helping people to dress, eat, urinate, and defecate simply is not an attractive 
career. Dealing with individuals in various stages of dementia is trying.”424 He 
adds that the lack of respect, little room for advancement, and stress of these 
jobs is not easily defrayed with money.425 Efforts to overcome the aspects that 
could be improved are thus even more critical; without high-quality options, 
many people will be unwilling to outsource care. 
                                               
417 Id. 
418 Brody, supra note 415.  
419 Id.  
420 See INST. OF MED., supra note 409, at 105.  
421 Id. at 124-25.  
422 Id. at 128-36. 
423  Even with the labor shortage of care professionals, wages have remained stagnant or 
declined slightly over the past decade. America’s Direct-Care Workforce, supra note 297, at 4-
5 (2013). 
424 White, supra note 226, at 63.  
425 Id.  
REIMAGINING THE RISK OF LONG-TERM CARE 
4.  Reshaping the Social and Institutional Baseline 
Finally, addressing the many ways that existing legal and social norms 
and institutions bias care choices is beyond the scope of this article but 
nonetheless important for policy development. As one example, FMLA job-
leave protections may be insufficient to support efforts to balance caregiving 
and paid work.426  
FMLA leave is limited to caregiving for a spouse, child, or parent, 
leaving out the many people who care for grandparents, siblings, aunts and 
uncles, or close friends. 427  Furthermore, some of its terms have been 
interpreted to exclude activities common in long-term caregiving. 428  For 
example, the term “provide care” has been interpreted to exclude time spent 
moving a parent into a new living arrangement that better met her health 
needs.429 The complexity of FMLA makes it difficult for people to understand 
what is covered.430 Finally, twelve weeks of leave may be too short in many 
cases, considering that the average period of informal care lasts 4.6 years.431 It 
is unrealistic to expect employers to hold jobs open for years, and this 
expectation would also be unproductive since such mandates can shift costs to 
workers. However, something more than twelve weeks is needed in some 
situations.432 The point is that there are many ways we could address these 
broader legal or social factors that exacerbate next-friend risk.  
CONCLUSION 
Taking next-friend risk seriously fundamentally shifts what it means to 
solve the long-term care crisis. It is not just a crisis faced by people who suffer 
from prolonged illness or disability. It is equally a crisis for their children, 
parents, siblings, grandchildren, aunts and uncles, and closest friends, who 
sacrifice their own wellbeing to care for them. They are interrupting their 
careers, their relationships, and their life pursuits. These next friends are 
invisibly bearing the costs of caring and experiencing disquieting insecurity in 
their own lives.  
By seeing these costs as evidence of an insurable risk and pursing 
policies that are more sensitive to this risk, we can create a society in which 
some people, especially women, no longer experience severe harms due to the 
tragic misfortune of having a loved one become ill or disabled. Better long-
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term care policy, defined as policy that aims equally to mitigate next-friend 
risk, can solve a problem that is perpetuating deep social inequities and can 
provide greater security for all families.  
Reimagining risk is an exercise with import beyond long-term care. Most 
social insurance programs and many regulations are based on implicit 
definitions of the risks that are worthiest of collective attention. By illustrating 
one field in which a narrow definition of risk has created an unstable 
foundation for policy-making, this article invites further examination of the 
law’s role in inscribing obligation for some and security for others by how it 
imagines risk.  
